超募融资、管理层权力与私有收益——基于IPO市场的经验证据

发布时间：2018-02-23 22:42

本文关键词： 超募融资管理层权力货币性私有收益非货币性私有收益　出处：《会计研究》2017年04期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：超募融资是关系到资本市场资源配置效率的重要问题,一直受到社会公众和监管部门的深切关注。以我国IPO超募融资为背景,结合管理层权力理论,本文探讨了IPO超募对高管私有收益的影响。以2006-2011年上市公司为样本,本文研究发现:(1)整体上,超募融资的上市公司其高管获得更高的货币性和非货币性私有收益;(2)区分产权性质,这一现象在国有企业和非国有企业中均显著存在;(3)结合管理层权力分析,管理层权力的增大有助于高管获取高额的货币性和非货币性私有收益,但这一关系主要存在于非国有企业;(4)市场对超募公司为高管发放超额货币性私有收益的行为,给予了负面的反应,而对于发放超额非货币性私有收益的行为没有显著反应。本文的发现拓展了超募融资、管理层权力经济后果的相关研究,并为超募融资效率的监管提供了一定的启示。
[Abstract]:Over-raising financing is an important issue related to the efficiency of resource allocation in the capital market, and has been deeply concerned by the public and regulatory authorities. This paper discusses the impact of IPO overfundraising on the private returns of executives. Taking the listed companies from 2006 to 2011 as a sample, this study finds that: 1) overall, Higher monetary and non-monetary private returns are obtained by the executives of the overfunded listed companies. (2) property rights are distinguished. This phenomenon exists significantly in both state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises) and combined with the analysis of management power. The increase of management power helps executives to obtain high monetary and non-monetary private returns, but this relationship mainly exists in the non-state-owned enterprises (Xinjiao)) the market for the over-raised companies to issue excess monetary private returns for executives. It gives a negative response, but has no significant response to the issuance of excess non-monetary private income. The findings of this paper expand the relevant research on the economic consequences of management power, such as over-raising financing, management power and economic consequences. It also provides some enlightenment for the supervision of financing efficiency.
【作者单位】：浙江财经大学会计学院;中央财经大学会计学院;常州大学商学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金(16BJY018) 国家自然科学基金(71402198) 中国博士后科学基金(2016T90361、2015M580314) 北京市社会科学基金(15JGC176) 中央财经大学青年英才培育计划(QYP1608) 北京市教育委员会共建项目北京市会计类专业群建设项目中央财经大学科研创新团队计划的资助
【分类号】：F272.91;F275;F832.51

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