家族超额控制与股价暴跌风险相关关系研究

发布时间：2018-03-07 19:08

本文选题：家族企业　切入点：超额控制权　出处：《浙江财经大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：近年来资本市场风云动荡,个股股票价格暴跌现象时常发生。股票市值的迅速蒸发极大损害了股东的利益,影响了企业的形象,动摇了投资者信心,不利于资本市场健康稳定发展。家族对控制权有着天生的偏好,家族终极控股股东在上市家族企业的股东大会、董事会上配置控制权,并通过金字塔结构、交叉持股、差异化股份、参与管理等方式获得了超额控制权。那么叠加在名义控制权之上的超额控制权究竟体现了什么效应?超额控制权究竟是增加了还是削弱了股价暴跌风险?本研究以家族企业为样本,研究家族超额控制权与股价暴跌风险的相关关系。本文通过对2011-2015年A股主板上市的家族企业共计890个观测数据进行实证检验,发现了如下结论:第一,家族董事席位占有率与股价暴跌风险呈负相关关系,家族成员任职董事会职位体现了利益协同效应,家族董事为实现家族财富与企业价值的最大化,有动机妥善经营公司,从而可减轻管理层的机会主义行为,缓解代理问题,从而降低股价暴跌风险。第二,家族董事会层面超额控制权与股价暴跌风险呈显著负相关关系。董事会层面家族超额控制体现了利益协同效应,增强了公司战略决策制定及执行的一致性,有利于缓解代理问题,从而降低了股价暴跌风险。第三,家族企业股东大会层面超额控制权与股价暴跌风险呈正相关关系,但实证结果不显著,两者的相关关系没有得到有效验证。可能由于本研究样本量较小因而未能证明关系。第四,家族总超额控制权与股价暴跌风险呈显著负相关关系。说明董事会层面超额控制权体现的利益协同效应大于股东大会层面超额控制权体现的掏空效应,家族总超额控制权体现了支持效应,家族为了企业的健康发展会勤勉经营,努力提升企业价值,提高信息披露质量,从而降低了股价暴跌风险。本文的创新之处在于本文将家族企业超额控制权按层次分解为董事会层面超额控制权和股东大会层面超额控制权,使用代理理论、信息不对称理论分层探讨超额控制权与股价暴跌风险之间的关系,实证检验了两者关系。本研究在一定程度上填补了超额控制权与股价暴跌风险相关关系的研究空白,研究结果对家族企业合理配置控制权结构从而降低股价暴跌风险具有一定的理论指导意义。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the capital market has been turbulent and individual stock prices have plummeted. The rapid evaporation of stock market value has greatly damaged the interests of shareholders, affected the image of enterprises, and shaken the confidence of investors. It is not conducive to the healthy and stable development of the capital market. The family has a natural preference for control. The ultimate controlling shareholder of the family allocates the control right in the shareholders' meeting and board of directors of the listed family enterprise, and through the pyramid structure, cross-shareholding. Differential shares, participation in management and other ways to obtain excess control. So what effect does the superposition of the excess control over nominal control reflect? Has excess control increased or weakened the risk of a stock crash? This study takes the family firm as a sample to study the correlation between the family excess control right and the risk of the stock price plummeting. This paper makes an empirical test on 890 family firms listed on the main board of A shares in 2011-2015. The conclusions are as follows: first, the share of family board seats is negatively related to the risk of stock price plummeting, and the position of family members in the board of directors reflects the benefit synergy effect, in order to achieve the maximum of family wealth and enterprise value, the family directors have a negative correlation with the risk of stock price plummeting. Having the motivation to run a company properly can reduce the opportunistic behavior of the management, ease the agency problem, and thus reduce the risk of the stock price plummeting. Second, There is a significant negative correlation between the excess control of the family board and the risk of stock price collapse. The family excess control at the board level reflects the benefit synergy and enhances the consistency of the company's strategic decision making and execution. It can alleviate the agency problem and reduce the risk of stock price collapse. Thirdly, there is a positive correlation between the excess control right at the level of shareholders' meeting and the risk of stock price collapse, but the empirical results are not significant. The correlation between the two has not been effectively verified. It may be that the relationship is not proved because of the small sample size in this study. 4th, There is a significant negative correlation between the total excess control of the family and the risk of stock price collapse, which indicates that the benefit synergy of the excess control at the board level is greater than the tunneling effect of the excess control at the level of the shareholders' general meeting. The total excess control of the family reflects the support effect. For the healthy development of the enterprise, the family will work diligently to enhance the value of the enterprise and improve the quality of information disclosure. The innovation of this paper is that the excess control of the family firm is divided into the excess control at the board level and the excess control at the general meeting of the shareholders, and the agency theory is used. The theory of information asymmetry delamination explores the relationship between excess control and the risk of stock price collapse, and empirically tests the relationship between the two. To some extent, this study fills up the blank in the study of the relationship between excess control and the risk of stock price collapse. The research results have certain theoretical guiding significance for family firms to allocate control structure rationally and reduce the risk of stock price collapse.
【学位授予单位】：浙江财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F832.51

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