大股东控股、报酬契约与合谋掏空——来自民营上市公司的经验证据

发布时间：2018-03-12 16:01

本文选题：掏空　切入点：合谋　出处：《外国经济与管理》2017年07期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：高管合谋是大股东掏空得以实现的必要环节,但高管是否愿意和大股东合谋取决于两个重要条件:大股东的控股程度与高管报酬契约。现有关于掏空的研究很少涉及高管合谋与合谋条件。理论分析发现大股东控股程度较低时对高管控制力度不够,需要高管合谋配合才能实现掏空。当大股东控股程度达到一定水平时,不再需要高管合谋。为达成合谋,大股东设计的报酬契约削弱了薪酬与业绩的敏感性。股权激励使高管成为股东,为抵制合谋提供内在动力。进一步的实证研究发现:当大股东持股水平较低时,掏空需要高管参与。为此,大股东对报酬契约进行了特殊设计:一方面给予合谋的高管更多薪酬,同时削弱薪酬业绩的敏感性,由此减轻高管因掏空损害业绩导致的薪酬损失;另一方面用隐性契约替代显性契约,给予高管更多在职消费,以隐性收入方式分享合谋租金。此外,高管持股不能抑制大股东掏空行为。与以往研究不同,本文发现只有在需要高管合谋的情况下大股东才有削弱薪酬业绩敏感性的动机。
[Abstract]:Executive collusion is an essential part of the hollowing out of large shareholders. However, the willingness of executives to collude with major shareholders depends on two important conditions: the degree of majority shareholder control and the executive compensation contract. The existing research on tunneling rarely deals with the conditions of executive collusion and collusion. When the level of East holding is low, the control of senior executives is not strong enough. When the level of majority shareholder control reaches a certain level, there is no need for executive collusion. In order to achieve collusion, The compensation contract designed by large shareholders weakens the sensitivity of compensation and performance. Equity incentives make executives shareholders and provide internal impetus to resist collusion. Therefore, the compensation contract is specially designed by the major shareholders: on the one hand, to give more compensation to the collusive executives, and at the same time to reduce the sensitivity of salary performance, thereby reducing the loss of compensation caused by emptying the performance; On the other hand, implicit contracts are used instead of explicit contracts, giving executives more in-service consumption and sharing collusive rent in the form of implicit income. This paper finds that only when there is a need for executive collusion can major shareholders have an incentive to reduce the sensitivity of pay performance.
【作者单位】：广东财经大学会计学院;
【基金】：国家社科一般项目(15BGL064)
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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