机构投资者参与现金类定向增发对上市公司业绩影响研究

发布时间：2018-03-16 09:36

本文选题：机构投资者　切入点：公司业绩　出处：《中国财政科学研究院》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：定向增发自从2006年正式在资本市场作为再融资工具服务上市公司以来,已经经历了十个年度,不可否认的是其对资本市场的促进作用,可为上市公司解决资金缺乏的燃眉之急。2017年《上市公司非公开发行股票实施细则》的修订以及《发行监管问答—关于引导规范上市公司融资行为的监管要求》的发布对于定向增发市场具有开启新纪元式的意义。其最大的影响就是整治广为人诟病的“定增乱象”,促进资金流向实体经济。机构投资者是定向增发的主要参与者,参与动机是获取回报,上市公司的内生性增长带动的业绩增长是获取回报的重要来源。现有研究主要集中于研究定向增发的市场反映、定向增发实施中大股东财富转移以及大股东资产注入,在研究过程中,机构投资者仅仅作为大股东参与的对照组,缺乏深入的分析。鲜有文章聚焦机构投资者视角观察投资者的参与对上市公司的业绩影响。笔者认为一是由于以前的文章数据较为陈旧,机构投资者自2010年开始超越大股东,成为定向增发认购对象主力,同时从2014年起,融资购买资产类定向增发在增发目的中与项目融资共同成为增发主要目的。二是由于过去一段时间内,法律法规不完善的前提下,大股东通过注资等方式进行利益输送,证实了“大股东掏空效应假说”,也存在大股东与机构投资者签订“兜底条款”联合投资者损害中小投资者利益。因此以往学者研究重点是对于大股东行为的制约。本文首先对定向增发的相关理论进行定义,包括定向增发理论、定向增发对象、公司业绩定义、衡量公司业绩方法等。在实证部分,采用因子分析法,研究上市公司在2007年度至2013年度机构投资者参与的定向增发。选取有机构投资者参与的全样本进行业绩变化研究,分组检验只有机构投资者参与的样本以及有大股东及其关联方与机构投资者一同参与的样本业绩变化。在两个分组中,检验项目融资类定向增发和融资购买资产类定向增发的业绩表现。得出如下结论:(1)面向机构投资者的定向增发业绩在实施当前出现提升,从第一年回落,第二年再回升。(2)只有机构投资者参与的定向增发,业绩表现好于大股东及其关联方一并参与的定向增发。只有机构投资者参与的样本组在增发实施第二年业绩超过增发前一年,大股东参与组在增发后第二年尚未提升至增发前一年的业绩。(3)项目融资类定向增发则明显导致上市公司业绩下滑,两个组别下滑都通过了显著性检验。但是大股东组下滑的程度要远远超过只有机构投资者认购组,说明机构投资者发挥了监督作用,有效控制项目融资中大股东“掏空行为”。(4)融资购买资产类定向增发显著提升上市公司的业绩。在两个组别中,有大股东及其关联方参与的组别要优于只有机构投资者参与的组别。两个组别在定向增发实施第二年时,业绩都超越了定向增发实施前。只有机构投资者样本组业绩呈逐年提升趋势,大股东参与样本组业绩先提升再回落,但是增发后两年都明显高于增发实施前一年。
[Abstract]:The private placement since 2006 formally in the capital market refinancing of listed companies as a tool service, has gone through ten years, it is undeniable that its role in promoting the capital market for listed companies to solve the lack of funds as pressing danger of non-public offering of stock in.2017 < > and < detailed rules for the implementation of the revised regulatory issue Q - a guide and standardize the behavior of listed companies from the regulatory requirements > release for the private placement market has opened a new era of the significance of the listed company. The greatest impact is widely criticized for the regulation set by the chaos ", promote capital flows to the real economy. The institutional investors are the main participants in the private placement, participation motivation is obtained in return, endogenous growth driven by the performance of listed companies is an important source of growth returns. Current research mainly focuses on the research on private placement City Field reflects the implementation of the private placement in shareholder wealth transfer and shareholder asset injection, in the course of the study, institutional investors only as control shareholder participation, lack of in-depth analysis. Few articles focus on institutional investors view investors of listed companies' performance. I believe that one is due to the previous data the relatively old, institutional investors began to surpass large shareholders since 2010, has become the main object of private placement subscription at the same time, from 2014 onwards, the financing to buy assets in the issuance of private placement purposes and project financing become common. Two additional main purpose is due to the past period of time, the premise of laws and regulations are not perfect, major shareholders transfer of benefits through capital injection, confirmed that the "tunneling effect hypothesis", there are also large shareholders and institutional investors signed a "pocket bottom clause" With investors to harm the interests of small investors. Therefore, previous research focus is restricted to the behavior of large shareholders. On the basis of the definition of the related theory of private placement, including placement theory, object placement, the performance of the company is defined to measure firm performance methods. In the empirical part, using factor analysis of Listed Companies in the year 2007 to the year 2013 oriented institutional investors to participate in the selection of the full sample. There are institutional investors to participate in the performance change of sample, only institutional investors to participate in the group test and sample performance changes of large shareholder and its related parties and institutional investors to participate. In two groups, test class placement and financing project financing buy the asset class performance of private placement. Draw the following conclusions: (1) orientation for institutional investors in the implementation of additional performance The current rise, from the first year to fall, second years again. (2) only the orientation of institutional investors to participate in the issuance, directional performance was better than the big shareholders and related parties are involved in the issuance. Only institutional investors to participate in the sample group in the implementation of additional performance over second years before the issuance of a year, the large shareholders to participate in the group after the issuance of second years has not increased to before the issuance of a one-year performance. (3) the project financing private placement will obviously lead to the decline in performance of listed companies, the two groups have slipped through a significant test. But the largest shareholder group decline more than only institutional investors group, indicating that institutional investors play a supervision effect of effective control of major shareholders "tunneling project financing". (4) to finance the purchase of assets of private placement to significantly improve the performance of listed companies. In two groups, with the largest shareholder and its related Party group is superior to the only institutional investors to participate in the group. Two groups of second years in the implementation of additional orientation, results are beyond the implementation of the private placement. Only institutional investors group performance was increased year by year trend, the large shareholders to participate in the sample group of the first performance of ascension fell again, but the additional two years are significantly higher than the issuance of the implementation the year before.

【学位授予单位】：中国财政科学研究院
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F832.51;F275

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