E公司控制权之争对公司绩效的影响研究
发布时间:2018-03-22 23:11
本文选题:控制权市场 切入点:国有控股 出处:《广东工业大学》2017年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文
【摘要】:2005年证监会颁布了《股权分置改革办法》后,非流通股开始向流通股转化;之后2006年证监会颁布了《上市公司收购管理办法》,我国对资本市场并购的态度更加温和。这两者构成了我国控制权市场发展的前提条件。而随着我国股权分置改革的完成以及全流通时代的到来,我资本市场不断完善发展以及上市公司质量的不断提高,控制权市场才慢慢形成。公司控制权对现代公司治理有着不可取代的核心地位,而公司控制权市场也是公司治理中重要的市场外部机制,通过对公司现有管理层造成持续的接管威胁来达到监督约束管理层,进而提高公司治理,是提升公司业绩的重要途径。虽然股权分置改革一定程度上完善了我国的资本市场,也激活了控制权市场,但由于我国特殊的国情以及控制权市场在我国发展的时间较短,我国的控制权市场效率相比国外较为低下。本文以国有控股E公司的控制权之争为例,分析了在股权分置改革后,我国控制权市场被激活的大背景之下,国有控股企业的控制权之争对其绩效的影响,来检验我国国有控股企业控制权市场这一外部监督机制的有效性。首先,本文回顾了控制权市场的相关概念和理论、国内外研究现状,分析了控制权市场与公司治理、公司绩效之间的关系以及作用路径;其次,本文以国家控股E公司为例,用事件研究法、会计研究法分析了在其控制权争夺前后公司短期市场绩效、长期市场绩效、长期财务绩效的变化;同时对比了控制权之争前后其公司治理,进而分析了E公司的控制权市场对公司绩效之间的影响。经过分析发现:E公司的控制权争夺对公司的短期市场绩效(CAR)有着正面的积极影响,在短期内增加了股东财富;而在控制权争夺之后公司的长期市场绩效(BHAR)呈现下降趋势;且通过财务指标分析以及EVA(经济附加值)的计算发现控制权之争在当年给公司的绩效带来负面影响,从长期(5年期)来看也没有能够给其公司绩效带来积极正面的影响。本文更进一步地对E公司控制权争夺前后的公司治理水平进行了衡量,发现在E公司的控制权之争后,其公司治理水平并没有得到提高。因而本文通过分析得出E公司的控制权市场缺乏效率,其国资背景对其控制权效率也有削弱作用。最后,通过对案例分析,得出可从完善资本市场的法律体系、规范控制权市场主体的行为、深化国有企业的改革、发挥公司治理的内外部机制的相互作用、提高资本市场本身的竞争机制等方面,来提高我国控制权市场的效率,促进我国控制权市场的进一步发展。
[Abstract]:In 2005, the Securities Regulatory Commission promulgated the "measures for the Reform of Non-tradable shares", and the non-tradable shares began to transform into tradable shares. Then, in 2006, CSRC promulgated the "Management measures for takeover of listed companies", which resulted in a more moderate attitude towards capital market mergers and acquisitions in China, which constituted a prerequisite for the development of the market of control rights in China. The completion of the revolution and the arrival of the era of full circulation, With the continuous improvement of our capital market and the continuous improvement of the quality of listed companies, the market of control rights has gradually formed. Corporate control rights have an irreplaceable core position in modern corporate governance. The market of corporate control is also an important external market mechanism in corporate governance. It can supervise and restrain the management by making continuous takeover threats to the existing management of the company, and then improve corporate governance. Although the reform of split share structure has improved the capital market and activated the control market to a certain extent, because of the special situation of our country and the short period of the development of the control market in our country, The efficiency of control market in our country is lower than that in foreign countries. This paper takes the dispute of control right of state-owned holding E company as an example, analyzes the background that the control market of our country is activated after the reform of split share structure. In order to test the effectiveness of the external supervision mechanism of the control market of state-owned holding enterprises, this paper reviews the relevant concepts and theories of the control rights market. At home and abroad, this paper analyzes the relationship between control market and corporate governance, corporate performance, as well as the role of the path. Secondly, this paper takes the state-controlled E company as an example, using the event research method, The accounting research method analyzes the changes of the company's short-term market performance, long-term market performance and long-term financial performance before and after the struggle for control rights, and compares its corporate governance before and after the struggle for control rights. After analyzing the influence of the control market of E company on the performance of the company, it is found that the scramble for control of the company has a positive effect on the short-term market performance of the company and increases the shareholder wealth in the short term. The long-term market performance (BHARs) shows a downward trend after the contention for control rights, and through the analysis of financial indicators and the calculation of EVA (Economic value added), it is found that the contention of control rights has a negative impact on the performance of the company in that year. From the long-term (5 years) point of view, there is no positive impact on the corporate performance. This paper further measures the corporate governance level before and after the E company control competition, and finds that after the E company control dispute, The corporate governance level has not been improved. Therefore, through the analysis of the lack of efficiency of E company's control market, the background of its state capital has weakened its control efficiency. Finally, through the case study, From the aspects of perfecting the legal system of the capital market, standardizing the behavior of the main body of the control market, deepening the reform of the state-owned enterprises, giving full play to the interaction of the internal and external mechanisms of corporate governance, and improving the competition mechanism of the capital market itself, etc. To improve the efficiency of China's control market, promote the further development of China's control market.
【学位授予单位】:广东工业大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F721;F715.5;F832.51
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