上市公司高管股权激励对业绩的影响研究

发布时间：2018-03-27 08:19

本文选题：股权激励　切入点：激励水平　出处：《南华大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：现代企业所有权、经营权相分离，引发了信息不对称、道德风险、逆向选择等委托代理问题。激励制度有利于这一问题的解决，刺激了股权激励的产生。股权激励通过给予管理者一定的激励股票，，使其成为股东，参与公司的剩余收益的分配，同时共担风险，有利于公司的利益、管理人员的利益与股东的利益的紧密联系，促使管理者提高经营效率，带动公司业绩的提升，缓解委托代理问题。在国外，股权激励制度的出现至今已有60多年的历史，大多数学者认为，股权激励的实施可显著提升上市公司的业绩。我国自2005年12月《上市公司股权激励管理办法（试行）》出台以来，股权激励制度得到较快的发展。但是，中外上市公司面临不同市场环境、自身条件有差异等，在我国，股权激励能否提高上市公司业绩，值得深入研究。本文从我国国情出发，实证研究了股权激励与上市公司业绩之间的关系。全文分为以下五章：第一章为绪论。主要介绍了研究的背景及意义，回顾了国内外相关研究成果，阐明了本文的研究思路、研究内容、研究方法及创新点。第二章界定了高管股权激励的概念，介绍了委托代理理论、人力资本理论、管理学激励理论，以及股权激励对公司业绩的作用原理，为实施股权激励奠定了理论基础。第三章回顾了股权激励在中国的历史演变和执行情况，指出我国股权激励实施过程中存在的主要问题。第四章为实证部分。选取2007-2011年实施股权激励的154家上市公司为研究样本，通过样本公司和配对公司横向与纵向的业绩对比，及利用多元回归分析，实证了股权激励与公司业绩之间的关系，同时，研究了不同行业股权激励的效果。第五章得出了本文的结论，指出本文的不足之处，并提出了充分发挥股权激励积极作用的对策建议。本文主要结论如下：（1）股权激励水平与上市公司业绩之间呈显著的正相关关系，即股权激励比例越大，企业业绩越好。（2）不同行业中，股权激励比例影响业绩的程度不存在显著差异。（3）现阶段我国股权激励存在实施范围较小、激励比例偏低、相关制度不健全等问题，股权激励对业绩提升的幅度较小，其有效性有待提高。
[Abstract]:The separation of ownership and management rights of modern enterprises leads to the problems of information asymmetry, moral hazard, adverse selection and other principal-agent problems. The incentive system is conducive to the solution of this problem. Equity incentive by giving managers a certain incentive to become shareholders, participate in the distribution of the company's residual income, at the same time, share the risks, which is beneficial to the interests of the company. The close relationship between the interests of the managers and the interests of the shareholders urges the managers to improve the management efficiency, to promote the performance of the company, and to alleviate the principal-agent problem. In foreign countries, the emergence of equity incentive system has more than 60 years of history, most scholars believe that, The implementation of equity incentive can significantly improve the performance of listed companies. Since the introduction of the measures on Equity incentive Management of listed companies (trial implementation) in December 2005, the equity incentive system has developed rapidly in China. Chinese and foreign listed companies are faced with different market environment and their own conditions are different. In our country, whether equity incentive can improve the performance of listed companies is worth further study. Based on the situation of China, this paper empirically studies the relationship between equity incentive and the performance of listed companies. The thesis is divided into the following five chapters: the first chapter is the introduction. It mainly introduces the background and significance of the research, and reviews the related research results at home and abroad. The second chapter defines the concept of executive equity incentive, introduces the principal-agent theory, human capital theory, management incentive theory. The effect of equity incentive on corporate performance lays a theoretical foundation for the implementation of equity incentive. Chapter three reviews the historical evolution and implementation of equity incentive in China. The main problems in the implementation of equity incentive in China are pointed out. Chapter four is the empirical part. 154 listed companies that implemented equity incentive from 2007 to 2011 are selected as the research samples, and the horizontal and vertical performance of the sample companies and matched companies are compared. And by using multiple regression analysis, this paper demonstrates the relationship between equity incentive and corporate performance, and studies the effect of equity incentive in different industries. Chapter five draws the conclusion of this paper, and points out the shortcomings of this paper. And put forward the countermeasures and suggestions to give full play to the positive role of equity incentive. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: (1) there is a significant positive correlation between the level of equity incentive and the performance of listed companies, that is, the greater the proportion of equity incentive, the better the performance of enterprises. There is no significant difference in the degree of influence of equity incentive ratio on performance. (3) at present, there are some problems such as small scope of implementation, low incentive ratio, imperfect related system and so on, and the extent of equity incentive to performance improvement is relatively small. Its effectiveness needs to be improved.
【学位授予单位】：南华大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F272.92

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