国有控股上市公司实施股权激励现状及效果研究

发布时间：2018-04-09 22:37

本文选题：股权激励　切入点：国有控股上市公司　出处：《西南交通大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：现代企业的两权分离导致了代理问题的产生。我国国有上市公司在国民经济中占有极为重要的地位,但其特殊的双层代理关系及缺少长期激励约束机制阻碍了其自身的发展。股权激励是处理长期激励问题的一种有效方法。该制度在许多西方国家得到了广泛应用。而我国对股权激励的实践开始的相对较晚。随着《国有控股上市公司(境内)实施股权激励试行办法》的正式颁布,这一制度才开始被国有上市公司广泛应用。但公司治理结构缺陷、高管任命制等问题的存在,使其方案的设计与实施易受到管理层控制,从而引发道德风险、分配不公等问题。我国国有企业实施股权激励制度能否产生良好的激励效果,成为政府与学术界关注的焦点。在此背景下,本文对国有上市公司实施股权激励的现状以及取得了何种效果进行分析,具有很强的理论与现实意义。本文在已有研究的基础上,首先,对股权激励相关文献进行了梳理,并对相关概念及理论基础进行了阐述,据此得出国有控股上市公司进行股权激励的原因;其次,对我国国有上市公司实施股权激励整体情况进行了概括描述,对其方案要素进行了统计分析,并与非国有上市公司进行了对比;再次,本文采用实证研究的方法,对股权激励的效果进行研究,其中,以激励比例来衡量股权激励水平,净资产收益率作为企业业绩的替代变量,经过严格筛选,得到了国有上市公司2011-2015年宣告并实施的52套股权激励方案数据作为研究样本,为进行对比分析,本文筛选了 261套同时期的非国有上市公司的股权激励方案数据作为对照样本;为验证不同激励模式对激励效果的影响,本文对不同模式下的公司业绩进行了方差分析;最后,对国有上市公司实施股权激励所存在的问题进行了总结,并给出了本文的建议。通过研究发现,国有上市公司实施股权激励存在行业分布分散、激励比例较低、激励模式较为单一、股票来源方式选择集中以及有效期较短等特点。通过实证分析发现,国有上市公司股权激励水平与公司业绩呈负相关,但不显著,非国有上市公司呈正相关,也不显著。在激励的模式选择对激励效果的影响方面,国有上市公司各激励模式产生的激励效果不存在显著差异,而在非国有上市公司中,股票期权模式产生的激励效果相比限制性股票模式更好。产生这种结果的主要原因在于我国企业实施股权激励制度的内外部环境仍不利于激励效果的发挥。为改善国有企业实施该制度的现状,本文提出了完善公司治理结构、建立竞争性经理人市场、培育有效的资本市场和健全相关政策法规的建议。而在股权激励方案设计上,股权激励模式的选择对国有上市公司业绩的影响不大,设计激励方案时可以结合自身内外部环境,选取合适的激励模式。
[Abstract]:The separation of two rights in modern enterprises leads to the emergence of agency problems.China's state-owned listed companies play an extremely important role in the national economy, but their special double-level agency relationship and the lack of long-term incentive and restraint mechanism hinder their own development.Equity incentive is an effective method to deal with long-term incentive problem.This system has been widely used in many western countries.However, the practice of equity incentive in China began relatively late.With the formal promulgation of the implementation of the pilot measures for Stock incentive of State-owned listed companies (in China), this system has only been widely used by state-owned listed companies.However, the defects of corporate governance structure and executive appointment system make the design and implementation of the scheme easy to be controlled by the management, which leads to moral hazard and unfair distribution.Whether the equity incentive system of state-owned enterprises in China can produce a good incentive effect has become the focus of attention of the government and academic circles.Under this background, this paper analyzes the current situation and the effect of the state-owned listed companies' equity incentive, which is of great theoretical and practical significance.On the basis of the existing research, firstly, this paper combs the relevant literature on equity incentive, and expounds the related concepts and theoretical basis, according to which the reasons for equity incentive of state-owned listed companies are obtained; secondly,This paper gives a general description of the implementation of equity incentive in state-owned listed companies in China, and makes a statistical analysis of the elements of the scheme, and compares it with the non-state-owned listed companies. Thirdly, this paper adopts the method of empirical research.The effect of equity incentive is studied, in which the equity incentive level is measured by incentive ratio, and the return on net assets is regarded as the substitute variable of enterprise performance.The data of 52 equity incentive schemes announced and implemented by state-owned listed companies from 2011 to 2015 are obtained as research samples. In order to carry out comparative analysis, 261 sets of equity incentive scheme data of non-state-owned listed companies in the same period are selected as control samples.In order to verify the influence of different incentive modes on the incentive effect, this paper analyzes the variance of corporate performance under different models. Finally, the paper summarizes the problems existing in the implementation of equity incentive in state-owned listed companies, and gives some suggestions in this paper.Through the research, it is found that the state-owned listed companies have the characteristics of dispersed industry distribution, low incentive ratio, single incentive mode, centralized stock source selection and short validity period.Through the empirical analysis, it is found that the equity incentive level of the state-owned listed companies is negatively correlated with the corporate performance, but not significant, and that the non-state-owned listed companies are positively correlated and not significant.In the aspect of the influence of incentive mode selection on the incentive effect, there is no significant difference in the incentive effect of each incentive model of the state-owned listed company, but in the non-state-owned listed company,The incentive effect of stock option model is better than restrictive stock model.The main reason for this result is that the internal and external environment of the equity incentive system is still unfavorable to the exertion of the incentive effect.In order to improve the present situation of implementing the system in state-owned enterprises, this paper puts forward some suggestions on how to perfect the corporate governance structure, establish a competitive manager market, foster an effective capital market and improve the relevant policies and regulations.However, in the design of equity incentive scheme, the choice of equity incentive mode has little effect on the performance of state-owned listed companies.
【学位授予单位】：西南交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F832.51;F272.92;F275

【参考文献】