市场化进程、股权激励与盈余管理

发布时间：2018-04-27 15:57

本文选题：市场化进程 + 股权激励　；参考：《石河子大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着所有权与经营权的分离以及职业经理人的出现，公司经营者与所有者的利益冲突逐渐突出，委托代理理论解释了该现象深层次的原因，之后股权激励为解决该现象提供一种可能。从最初的普通股到现在多种样式的股权激励方式，多个国家及地区的公司尝试过股权激励方案，以此来有效地激励高管层。股权激励制度在我国的发展相对比较滞后，但从股权分置改革及2006年颁布的《上市公司股权激励管理办法》之后，我国的股权激励从制度和实践方面都有了很大的完善和发展，股权激励相关的制度规范在逐步的完善中，股权激励在我国的运用日益广泛。对高管施行股权激励的目的是为了使高管与股东利益趋于一致，，减少代理冲突，但是对于股权激励对盈余管理起促进还是抑制作用的问题学术界仍有较大争议。如果高管为了达到股权激励行权标准而进行盈余管理，那么这种结果违背了股权激励制度的初衷，股权激励反而成为了高管从股东攫取利益的工具。本文试图探讨股权激励对盈余管理的影响，并结合我国实际情况，检验不同市场化进程下股权激励与盈余管理的关系。本文在相关理论和文献的基础上,先从逻辑上进行分析并提出假设,再从实证方面进行证明。通过对激励样本与配对样本的差异性检验本文发现：在基准年度，实施股权激励的上市公司存在显著向下的盈余管理；在首次考核业绩年度，行权价低于年底收盘价且实施股权激励的上市公司存在显著的向上盈余管理。之后本文以首次考核业绩年度激励样本高于配对样本的盈余管理为股权激励引起的向上盈余管理，选取首次考核业绩年度行权价低于年底收盘价的激励样本为回归样本，研究市场化进程、股权激励与向上盈余管理的关系，发现：股权激励与向上盈余管理正相关；市场化进程与向上盈余管理正相关；市场化进程加重了股权激励引起的向上盈余管理。以上结果表明，高管可以利用股权激励以及盈余管理实现自身利益，这为今后合理地制定股权激励计划提供了依据。
[Abstract]:With the separation of ownership and management rights and the emergence of professional managers, the conflicts of interests between company managers and owners become more and more prominent. The principal-agent theory explains the deep reasons for this phenomenon. Then equity incentive provides a possibility to solve this phenomenon. From the initial common stock to the present various forms of equity incentive companies in many countries and regions have tried equity incentive schemes to effectively motivate senior executives. The development of stock right incentive system is relatively lagging behind in our country. However, after the reform of split share structure and the "measures of stock incentive management of listed companies" promulgated in 2006, the stock right incentive system of our country has been greatly improved and developed in terms of system and practice. The institutional norms related to equity incentive are gradually perfected, and equity incentive is widely used in our country. The purpose of executive equity incentive is to make the interests of executives and shareholders converge and reduce agency conflicts, but there is still more controversy about whether equity incentive can promote or inhibit earnings management. If the executive carries on the earnings management in order to meet the standard of equity incentive exercise, then the result is contrary to the original intention of the equity incentive system. Instead, the equity incentive becomes the tool for executives to grab the benefits from the shareholders. This paper attempts to explore the impact of equity incentive on earnings management and to test the relationship between equity incentive and earnings management in different market-oriented processes. On the basis of relevant theories and literatures, this paper first analyzes and puts forward the hypothesis logically, then proves it from the empirical aspect. By testing the differences between incentive samples and matched samples, this paper finds that: in the base year, listed companies with equity incentive have significantly downward earnings management, and in the first performance appraisal year, The listed companies whose exercise price is lower than the closing price at the end of the year and which implement equity incentive have significant upward earnings management. Then this paper takes the earnings management of the first performance annual incentive sample higher than the matched sample as the upward earnings management caused by equity incentive, and selects the incentive sample with the annual exercise price of the first appraisal performance below the year-end closing price as the regression sample. After studying the marketization process, the relationship between equity incentive and upward earnings management, it is found that the equity incentive is positively related to the upward earnings management, the marketization process is positively related to the upward earnings management, and the equity incentive is positively related to the upward earnings management. The process of marketization has aggravated the upward earnings management caused by equity incentives. The above results show that executives can use equity incentive and earnings management to achieve their own interests, which provides a basis for the rational formulation of equity incentive plan in the future.
【学位授予单位】：石河子大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.51;F275;F272.92

【参考文献】