代理冲突视角下融资约束与企业研发投入的关系研究

发布时间：2018-04-29 07:32

本文选题：代理冲突 + 融资约束　；参考：《华南理工大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着国际竞争的加剧，一个国家只有拥有强大的自主创新能力，才能在激烈的国际竞争中把握先机、赢得主动。近年来我国RD经费投入继续保持稳定增长，国家RD经费投入强度创历史新高，并在新兴发展国家中居领先地位。然而，尽管企业投入在全社会研发投入中所占比重已经不低，但我国企业的研发投入强度却依然不足。企业研发投入的不足与面临融资约束相关联，代理冲突在二者关系间发挥了重要的调节作用，这既包括股东与管理层之间的代理冲突，也包括控股股东与其他股东之间的代理冲突。从代理冲突视角出发，研究企业面临的融资约束与研发投入的关系，是本文主要研究的问题。本文以2010-2012年中国创业板上市公司为样本，采用了理论分析与实证分析相结合的研究方法，研究了代理冲突下研究融资约束与企业研发投入的关系。在文献梳理和理论分析的基础上提出了本文的研究假设，通过设置研究模型和变量对提出的研究假设进行验证，实证部分中包括描述性检验、相关分析、多元回归分析，并对结果进行了稳健性检验，最终得出研究结论。本文的研究结果表明：(1)我国创业板上市公司的样本支持融资约束对研发投入的制约作用；(2)从股东与管理层之间的代理冲突来看，管理层持有公司股份、提高股权集中度可以缓解融资约束对研发投入的制约，股东与管理层之间的代理冲突的改善有助于缓解融资约束对研发投入的制约；(3)从控股股东与其他股东之间的代理冲突看，大股东持股比例越高则加剧了融资约束对研发投入的制约，形成股权制衡可以改善这种制约关系，所以控股股东与其他股东代理冲突的改善有助于缓解融资约束对研发投入的制约。本文认为，在我国企业研发投入不足，且金融市场不完善存在较强融资约束的环境下，在化解企业融资约束的同时，改善两类代理冲突，可以缓解融资约束对研发投入的制约。从政府层面看，应拓宽企业研发融资的渠道，构建企业研发投资的资助体系；从企业层面看，应调整对管理层的绩效考核方式，侧重对研发活动的绩效考核。通过管理层持股的方式调节股东与管理层的代理冲突，使双方的诉求趋于一致。完善股东和董事会的治理机制，减少内部人控制对研发投入的影响。还要引入股权制衡，，避免因一股独大而降低研发投入的情况发生。
[Abstract]:With the intensification of international competition, only if a country has strong independent innovation ability, can it grasp the opportunity and win the initiative in the fierce international competition. In recent years, China's R D expenditure continues to maintain a steady growth, and the intensity of the national R D funding has reached a record high, and has taken the lead in the emerging developing countries. However, although the proportion of enterprise investment in the whole social R & D investment is not low, the R & D investment intensity of Chinese enterprises is still insufficient. The deficiency of enterprise R & D investment is related to the financing constraint. Agency conflict plays an important role in regulating the relationship between them, which includes the agency conflict between shareholders and management. It also includes the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and other shareholders. From the perspective of agency conflict, it is the main problem of this paper to study the relationship between financing constraints and R & D investment faced by enterprises. Based on the sample of listed companies in China's gem from 2010-2012, this paper studies the relationship between financing constraints and enterprise R & D investment under agency conflict by using the combination of theoretical analysis and empirical analysis. On the basis of literature review and theoretical analysis, the research hypotheses are put forward, and the research hypotheses are verified by setting up research models and variables. The empirical part includes descriptive test, correlation analysis, multivariate regression analysis. And the results of robust test, the final conclusion of the study. The research results of this paper show that: (1) the sample of gem listed companies in China supports the restriction of financing constraints on R & D investment. (2) from the perspective of the agency conflict between shareholders and management, the management holds shares in the company. The improvement of agency conflict between shareholders and management helps to ease the constraints of financing constraints on R & D investment. (3) from the perspective of agency conflict between controlling shareholders and other shareholders, increasing equity concentration can ease the constraints on R & D investment caused by financing constraints, and the improvement of agency conflicts between shareholders and management is helpful to alleviate the constraints of financing constraints on R & D investment. The higher the shareholding ratio of large shareholders is, the more the restriction of financing constraints on R & D investment is intensified, and the formation of equity checks and balances can improve this kind of restriction relationship. Therefore, the improvement of agency conflict between controlling shareholders and other shareholders helps to ease the constraints of financing constraints on R & D investment. This paper holds that under the circumstance of insufficient investment in R & D of Chinese enterprises and the imperfection of financial market there are strong financing constraints. In the meantime of resolving the financial constraints of enterprises and improving the two kinds of agency conflicts, the constraints of financing constraints on R & D investment can be alleviated. From the government level, we should broaden the channels of enterprise R & D financing and construct the R & D investment funding system, and from the enterprise level, we should adjust the performance appraisal of management, and focus on the performance evaluation of R & D activities. The agency conflict between shareholders and management is regulated by the way of management ownership, so that the demands of both sides tend to be consistent. Improve the governance mechanism of shareholders and board of directors, reduce the impact of insider control on R & D investment. We should also introduce equity checks and balances to avoid reducing R & D investment due to a dominant share.
【学位授予单位】：华南理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F275;F273.1;F832.51

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