盈余管理、职业压力与财务总监离职——以操控性应计为例的实证检验

发布时间：2018-05-02 14:35

本文选题：财务总监 + 操控性应计　；参考：《北京工商大学学报(社会科学版)》2017年06期

【摘要】：在上市公司的盈余管理中,财务总监既是决策层面的重要参与者又是执行层面的主要负责人。鉴于财务总监需要对财务报告质量负责,上市公司的盈余管理行为极有可能给其带来职业压力,进而导致其离职。根据2007—2014年中国A股市场数据,实证检验发现:在一般情况下,上市公司的应计盈余管理水平越高,财务总监离职概率越大;财务总监持股和国有控股的企业性质,均能在一定程度上缓解盈余管理对财务总监离职的影响;外部审计师的审计意见在盈余管理和财务总监离职之间起到了部分中介作用。研究结论对资本市场的监管者、投资者以及上市公司等都具有一定的借鉴与启示。监管者和投资者应加强对上市公司财务总监离职信息披露的监督和关注;上市公司应进一步完善公司治理和健全内部控制,增强财务总监在财务报告上的独立性和话语权。
[Abstract]:In the earnings management of listed companies, the CFO is not only an important participant in decision-making but also the chief executive. In view of the financial director is responsible for the quality of financial reports, the earnings management behavior of listed companies is likely to bring professional pressure, and then lead to their separation. According to the data of China A-share market from 2007 to 2014, the empirical test shows that the higher the level of accrual earnings management, the greater the turnover probability of the CFO. Both of them can alleviate the influence of earnings management on the departure of CFO to a certain extent, and the audit opinions of external auditors play a part of intermediary role between earnings management and the departure of CFO. The conclusions of the study are useful for the regulators, investors and listed companies of the capital market. Regulators and investors should strengthen the supervision and attention to the disclosure of the financial director's leaving information of listed companies, and the listed companies should further improve corporate governance and improve internal control, and enhance the independence and voice of financial directors in financial reports.
【作者单位】：山东大学管理学院;厦门大学财务管理与会计研究院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71572095);国家自然科学基金青年项目(71102103) 山东大学青年学者未来计划(2016WLJH14)
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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