创新型企业与风险投资机构合作创新行为的演化分析

发布时间：2018-05-22 12:07

本文选题：创新型企业 + 风险投资　；参考：《重庆理工大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：创新型企业是当今社会响应建设创新型国家战略、进行技术研发创新的主力角色,却时常面临的资金缺乏的窘境,因此解决创新型企业融资难问题是帮助其不断发展壮大的关键。风险投资作为一种重要的融资手段,已经受到了学术界和企业界的格外关注,然而向创新型企业引入风险投资资金并不是单纯地将两者绑定在一起就能够解决问题的,相反,创新型企业和风险投资机构都必须具备一些必要的自身特点和业务能力才能彼此相互吸引,从而达成合作共识,且双方的优势互补和信息交融必然也会推动合作效应实现最大化。鉴于此,探究创新型企业和风险投资机构合作策略选择的影响因素,建立和探索这些影响因素与合作策略选择之间的交互关系,以及分析它们对长期均衡稳定状态的作用和机理是本文的主要研究内容。因此为解决创新型企业合作创新问题,加强创新型企业和风险投资机构之间的有效合作与互动,本文借助演化博弈方法,构建了创新型企业在寻求融资的过程中与风险投资机构之间的二阶段演化博弈模型,对双方的合作策略选择进行了动态稳定性分析,通过对模型参数的调整和分析,寻求有助于建立良性的演化状态的合理初始条件,并使用数值仿真工具,验证研究结果。研究结果表明,提高创新型企业自身的创新能力、不断增强企业的资产水平和管理水平是吸引风险投资的关键,同时风险投资机构也应扩大自己的社会网络资源、优化所提供的增值服务,并选择最合适的资金投入量,协商出双方均能接受的持股比例,从而最大可能地推动二者达成合作、共同创新。另一方面,降低业务成本,增强彼此的文化认同和契合,通过正式或非正式的控制确定恰当的奖励和惩处水平,最大程度地降低投机行为,力求创新型企业和风险投资之间相互信任、相互监管,则是促进彼此积极共赢、合作关系良性发展的重要举措。本文以技术创新企业和风险投资机构作为研究对象,运用演化博弈方法,并将其合作过程划分为合作关系建立阶段和合作关系维系阶段,突破了已有研究因偏重委托代理关系、契约治理等而造成的对二者合作关系理解的局限性,对进一步寻求双方有效合作的均衡状态提供了理论框架,同时对完善各种治理机制具有一定的参考价值和指导意义。
[Abstract]:Innovative enterprises are the main role of the society in response to the construction of innovative national strategy and technological research and development innovation, but often face the dilemma of lack of funds. Therefore, to solve the financing problem of innovative enterprises is the key to help them grow. As an important means of financing, venture capital has been paid special attention by academia and business circles. However, the introduction of venture capital to innovative enterprises is not a simple binding of the two to solve the problem, on the contrary, In order to attract each other, both innovative enterprises and venture capital institutions must have some necessary characteristics and business capabilities to reach a common understanding of cooperation. And the complementary advantages of both sides and the blending of information will certainly promote the maximization of the cooperative effect. In view of this, this paper explores the factors influencing the choice of cooperative strategies between innovative enterprises and venture capital institutions, and establishes and explores the interaction between these factors and the choice of cooperative strategies. The main content of this paper is to analyze their action and mechanism on long-term equilibrium and stability state. Therefore, in order to solve the problem of innovative enterprises' cooperative innovation and strengthen the effective cooperation and interaction between innovative enterprises and venture capital institutions, this paper makes use of evolutionary game method. This paper constructs a two-stage evolutionary game model between innovative enterprises and venture capital institutions in the process of seeking financing, and analyzes the dynamic stability of the cooperation strategy between the two sides. The reasonable initial conditions are found to be helpful to the establishment of a benign evolutionary state, and the numerical simulation tools are used to verify the results of the study. The results show that the key to attract venture capital is to improve the innovation ability of innovative enterprises and to enhance the level of assets and management of enterprises. At the same time, venture capital institutions should expand their social network resources. Optimize the value-added services and select the most appropriate amount of capital investment to negotiate the mutually acceptable shareholding ratio so as to push the two to achieve cooperation and joint innovation. On the other hand, reduce business costs, enhance mutual cultural identity and alignment, determine appropriate levels of incentives and penalties through formal or informal controls, and minimize speculation, To strive for mutual trust and mutual supervision between innovative enterprises and venture capital is an important measure to promote mutual positive win-win and healthy development of cooperative relationship. In this paper, technological innovation enterprises and venture capital institutions are taken as the research objects, and the evolutionary game method is used to divide the cooperation process into the stages of establishing cooperative relationship and maintaining cooperative relationship, which breaks through the existing research because of the emphasis on principal-agent relationship. The limitation of understanding the cooperative relationship between the two parties caused by contract governance provides a theoretical framework for further seeking the equilibrium state of effective cooperation between the two parties and also has certain reference value and guiding significance for the improvement of various governance mechanisms.
【学位授予单位】：重庆理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F279.2;F832.48

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