职业背景对独立董事选择性监督的影响研究——来自银行背景独立董事的经验证据

发布时间：2018-05-25 21:35

本文选题：银行背景 + 独立董事　；参考：《金融与经济》2017年10期

【摘要】：本文探究了独立董事的职业背景对其选择性监督行为的影响,并以银行背景为例,采用2004~2015年间我国A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了独立董事在不同企业中的监督行为。本文发现,银行背景独立董事整体上不发挥监督作用,但将其银行背景与企业的股权性质进一步区分为国有和非国有后,银行背景独立董事在不同企业中的监督作用表现出"同股权性质监督弱、异股权性质监督强"的现象,即在国有企业中,非国有银行背景独董比国有银行背景独董的监督更强,在非国有企业中,国有银行背景独董比非国有银行背景独董的监督更强。进一步的分析显示,银行背景独立董事会比其他类型独董更积极地监督与其银行背景股权相异的企业。
[Abstract]:This paper explores the influence of independent directors' professional background on their selective supervision behavior. Taking the banking background as an example, this paper empirically tests the independent directors' supervision behavior in different enterprises by using the A-share listed companies in China from 2004 to 2015 as a sample. This paper finds that the independent directors of banking background do not play a supervisory role as a whole, but the bank background and the equity nature of the enterprise are further divided into state-owned and non-state-owned. The supervisory function of independent directors of bank background in different enterprises shows the phenomenon of "weak supervision of the same equity nature and strong supervision of the different equity nature", that is, in state-owned enterprises, the background of non-state-owned banks is stronger than that of state-owned banks, and the supervision of independent directors of non-state-owned banks is stronger than that of state-owned banks. In non-state-owned enterprises, the supervision of state-owned banks is stronger than that of non-state-owned banks. Further analysis shows that the bank background independent board is more active than other independent directors in supervising enterprises with different bank background equity.
【作者单位】：中南大学商学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目“基于知识流动和社会资本的产业集群自主创新能力提升研究”(71072079)
【分类号】：F271;F832.51

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