众筹平台激励型监管对发起人策略行为的影响——众筹监管困境的演化博弈分析

发布时间：2018-06-09 02:00

本文选题：演化博弈 + 复制动态方程　；参考：《会计之友》2017年17期

【摘要】：在互联网金融众筹市场中,由于项目发起人和投资者之间严重的信息不对称,导致发起人违约风险问题。众筹平台作为网络中介平台,利用手续费优惠的激励和违规惩罚的威慑对发起人行为进行引导,可有效减轻和规避资金风险问题的发生。运用演化博弈理论,研究了具有有限理性的众筹平台和发起人之间策略选择互动机制,探讨了手续费优惠幅度和惩罚程度以及融资目标大小对发起人策略演化稳定均衡的影响,以及严格审查成本对众筹平台策略稳定均衡的影响,并给出了相关政策建议,为解决众筹市场中的违约风险问题提供了依据。
[Abstract]:In the Internet financing crowdfunding market, because of the serious information asymmetry between the project sponsors and investors, the sponsors default risk problem. As a network intermediary platform, the crowdfunding platform can effectively reduce and avoid the problem of capital risk by using the incentive of fee preference and the deterrent of illegal punishment to guide the initiator's behavior. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper studies the interaction mechanism between the limited rational crowdfunding platform and the promoters' strategy selection, and probes into the influence of the margin of fee preference and the degree of punishment, as well as the size of the financing target, on the evolutionary stability and equilibrium of the promoters' strategy. The influence of cost on the stable equilibrium of crowdfunding platform strategy is examined strictly, and the relevant policy suggestions are given, which provide the basis for solving the default risk problem in crowdfunding market.
【作者单位】：广东科技学院;武汉大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：广东省高等教育教学改革项目课题“基于新业态的应用型本科商贸类专业创业核心能力培养研究与实践” 广东科技学院院级项目“广东省现代服务业FDI与产业升级的关联性分析——基于灰色关联性分析法”(GKY-2016KYYB-28)
【分类号】：F224.32;F724.6;F832.51

【相似文献】