内部控制质量与媒体监督对管理层代理成本的影响研究
发布时间：2018-07-16 19:39
【摘要】：管理层代理成本的高低会直接影响到公司所有者和债权人以及其他利益相关者的权益，是影响企业资源有效配置和经济良性发展的重要因素之一。国内外关于如何缓解代理冲突、降低管理层代理成本的研究虽然很多，但是已有研究大多只关注公司内部治理机制的影响，忽视了公司外部治理机制可能对管理层代理成本产生的作用，结合公司内外部治理机制进行研究的就更较之甚少。因此，本文试图以公司内外部治理机制为视角，实证研究内部控制质量与媒体监督及两者的相互关系对管理层代理成本的影响，以期为如何有效降低管理成代理成本提供新的经验证据。 本文以委托代理与代理成本理论、信息不对称理论和利益相关者共同治理理论为基础，从理论上分析了内部控制质量、媒体监督以及二者的相互关系对公司管理层代理成本的影响。在此基础上，以2008至2011年5745家A股上市公司为样本，建立了多元线性回归模型，在控制了媒体监督样本自选择偏差后，分别考察了内部控制质量、媒体监督及二者间的相互关系对管理层代理成本的影响，并对媒体监督性质做了进一步研究。实证结果表明：（1）内部控制质量越高，公司管理层代理成本越低，即高质量的内部控制具有降低管理层代理成本的作用；（2）媒体监督具有发挥公司外部治理、降低管理层代理成本的作用，但是在不同产权性质背景下，媒体报道性质对管理层代理成本具有不同的影响。具体来看，在国有企业中，媒体报道（负面报道和非负面报道）具有监督公司治理、降低管理层代理成本的作用，但是对于非国有企业，，仅是媒体负面报道具有监督治理的作用；（3）高质量的内部控制与媒体监督在降低管理层代理成本上存在着互补关系，高质量的内部控制与媒体监督的共同治理对降低管理层代理成本、保护投资者利益具有更显著的作用。 最后根据理论分析与实证结论，本文从强化对内部控制的认识，提高内部控制质量、重视媒体监督的治理作用，提高公司治理水平两方面对如何更有效的降低管理层代理成本提出相关政策建议。
[Abstract]:The cost of management agency will directly affect the rights and interests of the owners, creditors and other stakeholders. It is one of the important factors that affect the effective allocation of resources and the benign development of the economy. Although there are a lot of researches on how to mitigate agency conflict and reduce the cost of management agency, most of the studies have focused on the influence of the internal governance mechanism of the company. It ignores the effect of the external governance mechanism on the agency cost of the management, and the research on the internal and external governance mechanism of the company is even less than that of the internal and external governance mechanism of the company. Therefore, from the perspective of internal and external governance mechanism, this paper attempts to empirically study the impact of internal control quality, media supervision and their relationship on management agency costs. In order to provide new empirical evidence for how to effectively reduce the cost of management agent. Based on the principal-agent and agency cost theory, information asymmetry theory and stakeholder governance theory, this paper theoretically analyzes the quality of internal control. The influence of media supervision and their relationship on agency cost of management. On this basis, taking 5745 A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2011 as samples, a multivariate linear regression model is established. After controlling the self-selection deviation of media supervision samples, the internal control quality is investigated respectively. The influence of media supervision and the relationship between them on the agency cost of management is also discussed, and the nature of media supervision is further studied. The empirical results show that: (1) the higher the quality of internal control, the lower the agency cost of management, that is, the higher the quality of internal control is, the lower the cost of management agency is; (2) the media supervision has the function of bringing into play the external governance of the company. Under the background of different property rights, the nature of media report has different influence on management agency cost. Specifically, in state-owned enterprises, media reports (negative reports and non-negative reports) have the function of supervising corporate governance and reducing agency costs of management, but for non-state-owned enterprises, (3) High quality internal control and media supervision have complementary relationship in reducing the cost of management agency. The joint governance of high quality internal control and media supervision plays a more significant role in reducing the agency cost of management and protecting the interests of investors. Finally, according to the theoretical analysis and empirical conclusions, this paper focuses on strengthening the understanding of internal control, improving the quality of internal control, and attaching importance to the governance role of media supervision. To improve the level of corporate governance two aspects of how to more effectively reduce the cost of management agency policy recommendations.
【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：G206;F275;F832.51
本文编号：2127464
[Abstract]:The cost of management agency will directly affect the rights and interests of the owners, creditors and other stakeholders. It is one of the important factors that affect the effective allocation of resources and the benign development of the economy. Although there are a lot of researches on how to mitigate agency conflict and reduce the cost of management agency, most of the studies have focused on the influence of the internal governance mechanism of the company. It ignores the effect of the external governance mechanism on the agency cost of the management, and the research on the internal and external governance mechanism of the company is even less than that of the internal and external governance mechanism of the company. Therefore, from the perspective of internal and external governance mechanism, this paper attempts to empirically study the impact of internal control quality, media supervision and their relationship on management agency costs. In order to provide new empirical evidence for how to effectively reduce the cost of management agent. Based on the principal-agent and agency cost theory, information asymmetry theory and stakeholder governance theory, this paper theoretically analyzes the quality of internal control. The influence of media supervision and their relationship on agency cost of management. On this basis, taking 5745 A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2011 as samples, a multivariate linear regression model is established. After controlling the self-selection deviation of media supervision samples, the internal control quality is investigated respectively. The influence of media supervision and the relationship between them on the agency cost of management is also discussed, and the nature of media supervision is further studied. The empirical results show that: (1) the higher the quality of internal control, the lower the agency cost of management, that is, the higher the quality of internal control is, the lower the cost of management agency is; (2) the media supervision has the function of bringing into play the external governance of the company. Under the background of different property rights, the nature of media report has different influence on management agency cost. Specifically, in state-owned enterprises, media reports (negative reports and non-negative reports) have the function of supervising corporate governance and reducing agency costs of management, but for non-state-owned enterprises, (3) High quality internal control and media supervision have complementary relationship in reducing the cost of management agency. The joint governance of high quality internal control and media supervision plays a more significant role in reducing the agency cost of management and protecting the interests of investors. Finally, according to the theoretical analysis and empirical conclusions, this paper focuses on strengthening the understanding of internal control, improving the quality of internal control, and attaching importance to the governance role of media supervision. To improve the level of corporate governance two aspects of how to more effectively reduce the cost of management agency policy recommendations.
【学位授予单位】：湖南大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：G206;F275;F832.51
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