P2P借贷平台上的行为博弈分析
发布时间:2018-08-31 16:47
【摘要】:作为最新一个挑战传统金融业的模式,以P2P借贷平台为代表的互联网金融在2013年撼动了中国金融市场,并重新引发了人们对于金融“脱媒”现象的关注。那么,P2P借贷平台在“脱媒”的条件下,借贷交易能否顺利、高效地实现呢?如何解决信息不对称问题?本文以互联网金融的代表模式——P2P借贷模式为研究对象,探讨了这一问题。 本文首先结合金融中介和金融“脱媒”理论,从交易成本和信息不对称角度,挖掘了P2P借贷模式“去中介化”的核心属性。分析发现,P2P借贷模式借助信息技术的发展,能够通过广泛而分散的交易产生规模效应降低交易成本,符合“脱媒”的理论体系,是典型的金融“脱媒”现象。随后,在对P2P借贷平台拍拍贷的案例研究中,系统描述了平台上借贷双方的行为特征,以及存在的借贷行为博弈关系,,借款人总是以更小的信息成本和贷款成本,满足对短缺资金的需求;而投资人总是希望在低风险的基础上投资更高利率的贷款项目。研究发现,P2P借贷平台上的信用体系指标,有助于在借贷行为博弈中构成均衡要素的条件。接下来,本文进一步引入了博弈理论,构建了不完全信息动态博弈模型,验证了借贷行为博弈能够达到均衡状态。最后,本文采用拍拍贷平台上的实际交易数据进行了实证分析,实证结果表明,“脱媒”条件下的P2P平台能够促成借贷交易与信息成本密切相关,体现了信息与资金在P2P平台的匹配。同时考察了“关键要素指标”在促成借贷交易上发挥的作用。基于本文论证的金融“脱媒”条件下,由于借贷行为博弈带来的市场有效性,提出了对P2P借贷模式给予规范和审慎监管,创新金融市场和服务进一步激发普通大众的金融热情,完善个人征信体系信用数据的对接等政策建议。
[Abstract]:As the latest model to challenge the traditional financial industry, Internet finance, represented by P2P lending platform, shook the Chinese financial market in 2013, and aroused people's attention to the phenomenon of financial disintermediation. So the P2P lending platform in the "disintermediation" conditions, the loan transactions can be smooth, efficient implementation? How to solve the problem of information asymmetry? In this paper, the representative model of Internet finance, P2P lending model as the research object, discussed this problem. Based on the theory of financial intermediation and financial disintermediation, this paper first excavates the core attributes of P2P lending model "disintermediation" from the angle of transaction cost and information asymmetry. With the development of information technology, P2P lending mode can reduce transaction cost through extensive and dispersed transaction scale effect, which accords with the theoretical system of "disintermediation" and is a typical phenomenon of financial "disintermediation". Then, in the case study of PPDAI, a P2P lending platform, the author systematically describes the behavior characteristics of the two parties on the platform, and the existence of a game relationship of lending behavior. The borrower always has a smaller information cost and loan cost. Meet the demand for scarce funds; investors always want to invest in higher-interest loans on a low-risk basis. It is found that the credit system index on P2P lending platform is helpful to the condition of equilibrium elements in the game of lending behavior. Then, this paper further introduces the game theory, constructs the incomplete information dynamic game model, and verifies that the borrowing behavior game can reach the equilibrium state. Finally, this paper uses the actual transaction data on PPDAI platform for empirical analysis. The empirical results show that the P2P platform under the condition of "disintermediation" can promote the loan transaction and information cost closely related. It reflects the matching of information and funds in P2P platform. At the same time, the paper examines the role of key factor indicators in facilitating lending transactions. Based on the disintermediation of finance, and because of the market effectiveness brought by the game of lending behavior, this paper proposes to regulate and prudently supervise the P2P lending model, and to innovate the financial market and service to further stimulate the financial enthusiasm of the general public. Perfect personal credit system credit data docking and other policy recommendations.
【学位授予单位】:对外经济贸易大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F832.4;F724.6
本文编号:2215573
[Abstract]:As the latest model to challenge the traditional financial industry, Internet finance, represented by P2P lending platform, shook the Chinese financial market in 2013, and aroused people's attention to the phenomenon of financial disintermediation. So the P2P lending platform in the "disintermediation" conditions, the loan transactions can be smooth, efficient implementation? How to solve the problem of information asymmetry? In this paper, the representative model of Internet finance, P2P lending model as the research object, discussed this problem. Based on the theory of financial intermediation and financial disintermediation, this paper first excavates the core attributes of P2P lending model "disintermediation" from the angle of transaction cost and information asymmetry. With the development of information technology, P2P lending mode can reduce transaction cost through extensive and dispersed transaction scale effect, which accords with the theoretical system of "disintermediation" and is a typical phenomenon of financial "disintermediation". Then, in the case study of PPDAI, a P2P lending platform, the author systematically describes the behavior characteristics of the two parties on the platform, and the existence of a game relationship of lending behavior. The borrower always has a smaller information cost and loan cost. Meet the demand for scarce funds; investors always want to invest in higher-interest loans on a low-risk basis. It is found that the credit system index on P2P lending platform is helpful to the condition of equilibrium elements in the game of lending behavior. Then, this paper further introduces the game theory, constructs the incomplete information dynamic game model, and verifies that the borrowing behavior game can reach the equilibrium state. Finally, this paper uses the actual transaction data on PPDAI platform for empirical analysis. The empirical results show that the P2P platform under the condition of "disintermediation" can promote the loan transaction and information cost closely related. It reflects the matching of information and funds in P2P platform. At the same time, the paper examines the role of key factor indicators in facilitating lending transactions. Based on the disintermediation of finance, and because of the market effectiveness brought by the game of lending behavior, this paper proposes to regulate and prudently supervise the P2P lending model, and to innovate the financial market and service to further stimulate the financial enthusiasm of the general public. Perfect personal credit system credit data docking and other policy recommendations.
【学位授予单位】:对外经济贸易大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:F832.4;F724.6
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