晋升激励与国有企业异常捐赠

发布时间：2018-03-01 02:20

本文关键词： 国有企业晋升激励异常捐赠资源依赖理论　出处：《财经科学》2017年04期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：结合资源依赖理论,以2008—2014年国有企业上市公司为研究样本,对国企高管谋求政治晋升而产生的相关后果进行实证检验并提供经验证据。研究发现,在国有企业中普遍存在着异常社会捐赠问题。进一步研究发现,国企中存在的异常社会捐赠与其高管的任职年限呈负相关关系,也即高管任职年限越短,其晋升的可能性越大,该企业的异常捐赠额度越高。这从一定程度上说明了国企高管为了谋求政治晋升而有意识地进行了国企的社会形象管理,意在提高自身的社会形象,从而为自身的政治晋升做好铺垫。央企高管比地方国企高管更加注重社会形象管理,公益类国企高管进行社会形象管理的动机比竞争类国企高管更加强烈。此外,某些外部环境变量,如年度和行业等对实证结果没有显著影响。
[Abstract]:Combined with the theory of resource dependence, taking the listed companies of state-owned enterprises from 2008 to 2014 as the research sample, the paper empirically tests and provides empirical evidence on the related consequences of state-owned enterprise executives seeking political promotion. The problem of abnormal social donation exists generally in state-owned enterprises. Further study shows that the abnormal social donation in state-owned enterprises is negatively related to their seniority, that is, the shorter the seniority of senior executives, the more likely they are to be promoted. The higher the amount of unusual donations made by the enterprise, the more, to some extent, executives of state-owned enterprises have consciously managed the social image of state-owned enterprises in order to seek political advancement, with a view to improving their own social image. In order to pave the way for their own political advancement, executives of central enterprises pay more attention to social image management than local executives of state-owned enterprises, and executives of public enterprises are more motivated to conduct social image management than those of competitive state-owned enterprises. In addition, Some external environmental variables, such as year and industry, have no significant impact on empirical results.
【作者单位】：北京工商大学商学院;
【分类号】：F272.92;F276.1

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