董事会社会独立性与CEO变更——基于违规上市公司的研究

发布时间：2018-03-14 21:28

本文选题：社会独立性　切入点：CEO变更　出处：《管理科学》2017年02期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：当公司违规时对CEO及时有效地进行变更是董事会的重大决策之一,董事会作为上市公司监督和决策的重要机构,其独立性至关重要。董事会独立性是公司治理的灵魂,已有研究将董事会独立性作为一种形式上的独立性,忽略了可能影响董事会职能发挥的其他社会因素,如董事会成员与CEO非正式关系和人口统计学特征的匹配程度,因此有必要进一步探讨董事会社会独立性。采用社会网络和社会认同理论,从董事会监督职能有效性发挥角度,创新性地构建包含认知和关系双层的董事会社会独立性测量指标,以2011年至2014年沪深A股发生CEO变更的上市公司及其配对公司为样本,运用probit模型实证研究不同情景下,当公司出现违规行为时,董事会社会独立性对CEO变更的影响效应。研究结果表明,(1)董事会社会独立性越高,违规公司的CEO越容易发生变更行为,董事会成员与CEO关系亲密以及人口统计学特征相近所形成的较高的契合度使董事会无法客观公正地评判和监督CEO的业绩表现;(2)董事会社会独立性效应的发挥与上市公司的所有权性质和业绩表现有关,在民营企业和劣绩公司,董事会社会独立性的调节效应更显著;(3)良好的制度环境等外部治理机制为董事会社会独立性的效用发挥提供了保障,董事会社会独立性只有在外部治理较好的情形下才会影响违规公司的CEO变更。董事会社会独立性作为独立性研究的拓展,具有重要的理论意义和现实意义。研究结果表明提升公司治理有效性,不仅在于保持结构的独立,还需要提升董事会的社会独立性。公司应严格把控"关系型"和"相似型"CEO,同时还应创造独立良好的外部治理环境,保障董事会更好地发挥监督职能。
[Abstract]:When the company breaches of CEO effectively and timely change of the board of directors is one of the major decisions, the board of directors of listed companies as an important mechanism of supervision and decision-making, its independence is very important. The independence of the board of directors is the soul of corporate governance, the existing research to the independence of the board of directors are independent of a form, ignore the board of directors may affect the function of other social factors, such as the matching degree of the members of the board of directors and the CEO informal relationship and demographic characteristics, so it is necessary to further discuss the board of directors of the independent community. The social network and social identity theory, from the board of directors supervision effectiveness of angle, innovatively constructed including cognitive and the relationship between the board of directors of double social independence measure, from 2011 to 2014 in Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares of CEO listed companies change and matched companies as samples, using probit An empirical study of the model under different scenarios, when companies with irregularities, the board of directors of the independent social effect on the turnover of CEO. The results show that, (1) the board of directors of the independent social higher violations of company CEO are more prone to change the behavior of the members of the board of directors, and CEO intimate relationships and demographic features are similar. The high degree of fit to the board of directors to judge objectively and supervise the performance of CEO; (2) the nature of ownership and performance play with the board of directors of the listed company social independence effect on private enterprises and poor performance in the company, the board of directors of the independent social adjustment effect is more significant; (3) a good institutional environment, external governance mechanism provides a guarantee for the board to play independent social utility, the board of directors of the independent community only in the case of good external governance will affect the company's illegal CEO change. The board extended independent society as independent research, has important theoretical significance and practical significance. The research results show that enhancing the effectiveness of corporate governance structure, not only maintain independence, but also need to improve the social independence of the board of directors. The company should strictly control the "relationship" and "similarity" CEO, you should also create a good external governance environment of independent guarantee, the board of directors to better play the function of supervision.

【作者单位】：南开大学中国公司治理研究院;天津财经大学商学院;南开大学商学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金(71533002,71572081) 教育部长江学者和创新团队发展计划项目(IRT0926) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(NKZXB1239)~~
【分类号】：F271

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