现金持有、公司治理与代理成本——基于产权的调节效应

发布时间：2018-03-26 20:23

本文选题：现金持有　切入点：产权　出处：《经济管理》2017年08期

【摘要】：基于近几年证监会出台一系列鼓励上市公司现金分红的政策背景,本文以我国沪深A股上市公司为样本,研究现金持有对企业代理成本的影响,并分析产权和公司治理机制对二者关系的调节作用。研究结果表明,现金持有增加会提高企业代理成本,产权对现金持有与代理成本的关系存在正向调节效应。本文进一步检验了公司治理机制的治理作用,并将公司治理机制分为两类。实证结果表明,外部治理机制对于约束国有企业代理问题更有效,内部治理机制对缓解民营企业代理问题更有效。本文结论说明,对于不同产权类型的企业,需从不同治理机制入手以缓解企业代理问题。本文结论为当前我国国有企业改革方向和途径提供了理论参考,同时,也为当前证监会鼓励上市公司现金分红的政策提供实证依据。
[Abstract]:Based on a series of policies to encourage cash dividends of listed companies in recent years, this paper takes Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as a sample to study the impact of cash holdings on corporate agency costs. The results show that the increase of cash holding will increase the agency cost. Property right has positive effect on the relationship between cash holding and agency cost. This paper further tests the governance function of corporate governance mechanism, and divides the corporate governance mechanism into two categories. The external governance mechanism is more effective in restricting the agency problems of state-owned enterprises, and the internal governance mechanism is more effective in alleviating the agency problems of private enterprises. It is necessary to start with different governance mechanisms in order to alleviate the problem of enterprise agency. The conclusion of this paper provides a theoretical reference for the direction and approach of the reform of state-owned enterprises in our country, at the same time, Also for the current Securities Regulatory Commission to encourage listed companies to cash dividend policy to provide empirical basis.
【作者单位】：武汉大学经济与管理学院;
【分类号】：F271;F275

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