公共选择理论下的税收成本与社会契约形式转变

发布时间：2018-03-27 04:43

本文选题：税收的时间扭曲　切入点：税收成本　出处：《财经论丛》2017年09期

【摘要】：本文从布坎南和福特所构建的"间接税分析模型"中分析出了不同的税收规则给纳税人带来的不同的时间扭曲,并将这种时间扭曲理解为税收成本。征税者也存在根据完税时间来调整预期支出结构的行为,这样一种税收成本概念同样适用于征税者。由此,在构建了一个社会契约一般原则之后,本文尝试从税收成本的角度对社会契约形式转变予以分析。认为只有在纳税人和征税者之间对完税的时间具有预期一致性时,也就是双方税收成本相等,社会契约得以稳定存在。如果纳税人由于税收规则带来的扭曲从而使其对社会契约的认知发生改变,纳税人将移动税收成本曲线,从而使得社会契约形式从"霍布斯契约"向"洛克契约"发生转变。
[Abstract]:Based on the indirect tax analysis model constructed by Buchanan and Ford, this paper analyzes the different time distortions that different tax rules bring to taxpayers. And to interpret this time warping as tax cost. There is also behavior on the part of the tax collector to adjust the structure of the expected expenditure according to the time paid. Such a concept of tax cost also applies to the tax collector. After constructing a general principle of social contract, this paper tries to analyze the transformation of social contract form from the perspective of tax cost. That is, the tax costs of both parties are equal, and the social contract can exist stably. If the taxpayer changes his perception of the social contract because of the distortion brought about by the tax rules, the taxpayer will move the tax cost curve. Thus, the form of social contract changes from Hobbes contract to Locke contract.
【作者单位】：上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金资助项目(16FJL021)
【分类号】：F275.4;F812.42

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