零杠杆公司中银行债权人的缺失会加重股东与管理层间的代理冲突吗

发布时间：2018-04-11 14:53

  本文选题：零杠杆政策 + 银行债权人缺失　； 参考：《财贸研究》2016年02期

【摘要】：以中国沪深股市2007—2013年上市公司为样本,从银行债权人缺失的视角实证检验零杠杆政策对股东与管理层间代理冲突的影响。结果表明:由于银行债权人的缺失,零杠杆公司中因股东与管理层间的代理冲突所产生的代理成本显著高于杠杆公司;零杠杆政策的持续时间越长,由股东与管理层间的代理冲突所产生的代理成本就越大;此外,公司采用零杠杆"进入"决策时,零杠杆"进入"决策当年的代理成本显著高于"进入"决策前一年度的代理成本。
[Abstract]:Based on the sample of listed companies in China's Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2007 to 2013, this paper empirically examines the impact of zero-leverage policy on the agency conflict between shareholders and management from the perspective of bank creditor deficiency.The results show that the agency cost caused by the conflict between shareholders and management in the zero-leverage company is significantly higher than that in the leveraged company due to the lack of bank creditors, and the longer the zero-leverage policy lasts,The greater the agency costs arising from agency conflicts between shareholders and management; in addition, when companies use zero leverage to "enter" decisions,The agency cost in the year of zero leverage entry decision is significantly higher than that in the year prior to entry decision.
【作者单位】： 西安交通大学管理学院;上海对外经贸大学会计学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学研究西部和边疆地区青年基金项目“重要性判断、公司治理与财务重述信息披露”(14XJC790001)
【分类号】：F275
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本文编号：1736457