服务联盟运作中线上核心企业的质量控制研究

发布时间：2018-06-13 07:02

本文选题：线上线下服务联盟 + 服务运作　；参考：《系统管理学报》2017年05期

【摘要】：服务联盟运作尤其是线上线下服务联盟运作是服务经济时代依托现代信息技术而发展起来的商业模式,其运作模式有别于传统服务运作,质量控制也存在诸多特殊性,传统的服务企业质量控制和供应链联盟质量控制方法不再适用。通过对初级的、整合线上线下服务联盟运作特征的、考虑前景展望理论的3个层级质量激励模型的比较分析后发现,代理企业的直接质量收益和前景理论必须被考虑到联盟运作的质量激励机制中。研究结果显示:核心企业在服务联盟运作中,除了根据相关指标构建正面激励机制外,负面激励机制更为有效,具体包括构建质量懈怠信息的获取渠道和提高惩罚系数;线上核心企业委托给线下代理企业顾客规模的合理确定是质量激励机制乃至联盟服务运作能否成功的关键。
[Abstract]:Service alliance operation, especially online and offline service alliance operation, is a business model developed by modern information technology in the era of service economy. Its operation mode is different from traditional service operation, and quality control also has many particularities. The traditional quality control methods of service enterprises and supply chain alliances are no longer applicable. Based on the comparative analysis of three levels of quality incentive models of primary, integrated on-line and offline service alliances and considering the prospect outlook theory, it is found that, The theory of direct quality return and prospect of agency enterprises must be taken into account in the quality incentive mechanism of alliance operation. The results show that: in the operation of service alliance, the negative incentive mechanism is more effective than the positive incentive mechanism according to the relevant indicators, including the construction of quality slack information access channels and improve the punishment coefficient; The reasonable determination of the customer scale of the online core enterprise entrusted to the offline agent is the key to the success of the quality incentive mechanism and even the operation of the alliance service.
【作者单位】：中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院;中国科学院科技政策与管理科学研究所;同济大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71402073);国家自然科学基金重点项目(71532015)
【分类号】：F274

【相似文献】