合同制造商纵向差异化市场进入策略研究

发布时间：2018-06-26 01:28

  本文选题：竞合 + 市场进入　； 参考：《南京大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：本文主要考虑了由一个原始设备制造商(OEM)和一个合同制造商(CM)组成的二级供应链,在该二级供应链上,OEM将产品外包给CM进行生产,然后由OEM贴牌销售给消费者。我们最主要研究的问题是,CM是否应该推出纵向差异化产品进入下游OEM所在市场。我们建立了两个博弈模型,一个是CM不进入模型,一个是CM进入模型。我们假设市场上存在两类异质性消费者,一类是忠诚类(Royalist-type)消费者,一类是机会类(Switcher-type)消费者。通过对模型的比较分析,我们发现S类消费者人数以及他们最大支付意愿会影响CM进入市场的决策。i)如果OEM只覆盖R类消费者市场,CM一定会推出差异化产品进入市场;如果OEM同时覆盖R、S两类消费者市场,当S类消费者人数以及他们的最大支付意愿满足一定条件时,CM不会推出差异化产品进入市场。ii)在大多数的情况下,CM进入市场对其自身的收益是有利的,甚至在满足一定的条件下,CM进入市场能带来双赢的局面。从OEM的角度看,CM进入市场的决策会直接影响它消费者市场覆盖的倾向。
[Abstract]:In this paper, a secondary supply chain consisting of an OEM and a contract manufacturer (CM) is considered. In the secondary supply chain, OEM outsources the product to CM for production, and then OEM stickers sell it to consumers. Our main question is whether CM should introduce vertical differentiation products into the downstream OEM market. We establish two game models, one is CM does not enter the model, the other is CM entry model. We assume that there are two kinds of heterogeneous consumers in the market, one is the Royalist-type consumer, the other is the Switcher-type consumer. Through the comparative analysis of the model, we find that the number of S consumers and their maximum willingness to pay will affect CM's decision to enter the market. I) if OEM only covers R consumer market, CM will definitely launch differentiated products to enter the market. If the OEM covers the RMS consumer market at the same time, When the number of category S consumers and their maximum willingness to pay meets certain conditions, the CM does not launch a differentiated product to enter the market. Even in the satisfaction of certain conditions to enter the market CM can bring a win-win situation. From the perspective of OEM, CM's decision to enter the market will directly affect its tendency to cover the consumer market.
【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F274
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本文编号：2068436