机构投资者调研与管理层盈余预测方式

发布时间：2018-06-26 02:10

本文选题：机构投资者调研 + 管理层盈余预测　；参考：《管理科学》2017年01期

【摘要】：管理层盈余预测作为改善公司信息环境的重要手段之一,受到研究者们的广泛关注,近年来相关研究越来越强调具有信息优势的管理层会对业绩预告的披露时间和方式进行战略性选择,以实现自身利益最大化的目的。因此,对如何抑制管理层利用信息优势谋取私利、提高盈余预测精确度这一问题进行研究具有重要意义。从信息不对称视角入手,以2013年至2015年深圳交易所披露管理层盈余预测的上市公司为研究样本,采用顺序Logit模型等多元回归分析方法,实证检验机构投资者调研与管理层盈余预测方式的关系,并进一步考察盈余预测信息性质和产权性质对二者关系的影响。以每个上市公司一年内接待的机构投资者调研次数或一年内接待的机构投资者总数的自然对数测量机构投资者调研频率。根据管理层盈余预测精确度将管理层预测分为4类,即当管理层盈余预测为点估计时赋值为4,为闭区间估计时赋值为3,为开区间估计时赋值为2,为定性预测时赋值为1。研究结果表明,总体而言机构投资者调研越频繁的公司,其管理层越倾向于采用模糊的方式预测盈余,并且这种影响在盈余预测信息为坏消息时更为明显,以上情形主要存在于非国有企业中。进一步检验发现,相对于买方机构而言,卖方机构的调研行为更有可能导致管理层采用模糊方式进行盈余预测,公募基金和私募基金的调研行为对预测方式的影响并无显著差异。上述研究结果在进行工具变量两阶段最小二乘回归、Heckman两阶段检验等一系列稳健性检验后依然成立。机构投资者作为重要的市场参与者,其行为一直受到广泛关注,与已有认为机构投资者与管理层直接沟通能够有助于降低信息不对称程度的研究不同,研究结果表明机构投资者调研给公司带来了业绩压力,从而使其更倾向于选择模糊的方式进行盈余预测,拓展了机构投资者行为对资本市场信息环境影响的相关研究,同时为中国投资者更有效地理解和利用管理层业绩预告信息进行决策、监管机构进一步完善上市公司信息披露规定、保护中小投资者权益提供了经验借鉴。
[Abstract]:As one of the important means to improve the information environment of the company, the management earnings prediction has been widely concerned by researchers. In recent years, more and more researches have emphasized that managers with information advantages will make strategic choices on the time and mode of disclosure of performance forecasts, in order to achieve the goal of maximizing their own interests. Therefore, it is of great significance to study how to restrain the management from making use of information advantages for private gain and to improve the accuracy of earnings prediction. From the perspective of information asymmetry, this paper takes listed companies which disclose management earnings forecast in Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2013 to 2015 as research samples, and adopts multiple regression analysis, such as sequential logit model, etc. The empirical study examines the relationship between institutional investor research and management earnings forecasting, and further examines the impact of the nature of earnings forecasting information and property rights on the relationship between the two. The natural logarithm of the total number of institutional investors received by each listed company within one year or the number of institutional investors received within one year measures the frequency of institutional investor research. According to the accuracy of management earnings prediction, the management forecast is divided into four categories, namely, when the management earnings forecast is a point estimate, the value is assigned to 4, the value to the closed interval estimation is 3, the value to the open interval estimate is 2, and the value to the qualitative prediction is 1. The results show that, in general, the more frequent the institutional investors survey, the more the managers tend to forecast earnings in a fuzzy way, and this effect is more obvious when the earnings forecast information is bad news. The above situation mainly exists in non-state-owned enterprises. Further tests show that the research behavior of the seller's organization is more likely to lead the management to make the earnings prediction in a fuzzy way than the buyer's organization. There is no significant difference between the research behavior of public funds and private funds. The above results still hold true after a series of robust tests such as two-stage least square regression and Heckman two-stage test of tool variables. As an important market participant, the behavior of institutional investors has been widely concerned, unlike the existing research that direct communication between institutional investors and management can help reduce the degree of information asymmetry. The results show that institutional investor research brings performance pressure to the company, which makes it more inclined to choose a fuzzy way to predict earnings, and extends the relevant research on the impact of institutional investor behavior on the information environment of capital market. At the same time, it provides experience and reference for Chinese investors to understand and use management performance forecast information more effectively, regulators to further improve the information disclosure regulations of listed companies, and to protect the rights and interests of small and medium-sized investors.
【作者单位】：北京交通大学经济管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金(71272055,71572009)~~
【分类号】：F275

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