博元投资公司违规信息披露案研究

发布时间：2018-08-14 18:13

【摘要】：许多文献表明,良好的公司治理结构对上市公司信息披露质量具有正向影响。这一观点也可从近年来资本市场上大量由于公司治理问题导致上市公司信息违规披露事件中略见一斑。公司本质上是“人”的组织,公司治理结构则是公司各利益相关者在法律、制度和规则框架下博弈的结果。因此,股权结构、管理层结构等决定公司权力结构的公司治理特征,才是上市公司在面对外部压力时,尤其是来自资本市场规制中的阈值压力时会计信息违规披露的深层原因。而这一点,却常被学术界忽视。本文则试图以公司治理视角重新审视博元投资违规信息披露案。本文的结构安排如下,第一章介绍了本文的写作背景,并对国内外公司治理和会计信息质量的研究现状进行评述;第二章首先介绍本文的理论基础,而后对公司治理结构对会计信息披露质量的影响机制进行理论分析;第三章介绍博元投资违规信息披露案始末;第四章使用第二章理论分析的结果,从公司治理视角深入剖析博元投资违规信息披露案的原因,并提出改进建议;第五章是本文的启示和研究的局限。本文认为,博元投资公司分散化的股权结构是违规信息披露的深层原因。这种股权结构导致公司的控制权与剩余收益分享权不匹配,当经营业绩下滑,公司面临资本市场阈值压力时,实际控制人要么选择出逃策略,表现为公司频繁易主;要么通过会计造假排解压力,铤而走险。若要提高公司信息披露质量,本文的建议是,一是提高股权集中度,即提高控制权与剩余收益分享权的匹配程度;二是加大机构投资者的持股比例;三是充分发挥独立董事制度、监事会制度对实际控制人的制衡机制;四是提高上市公司违规信息披露的成本,即证监会对违规信息披露的上市公司加大处罚力度,增加退市制度的执行力。
[Abstract]:Many literatures show that good corporate governance has a positive impact on the quality of information disclosure of listed companies. This view can also be seen in recent years in a large number of capital markets due to corporate governance problems resulting in information disclosure of listed companies. The company is essentially a "person" organization, while the corporate governance structure is the result of a game between the stakeholders under the framework of laws, systems and rules. Therefore, the corporate governance characteristics, such as ownership structure, management structure and so on, are the deep reasons for the listed companies to disclose accounting information illegally when facing the external pressure, especially the threshold pressure from the capital market regulation. This point, however, is often ignored by the academic community. This paper tries to re-examine the case of information disclosure in the perspective of corporate governance. The structure of this paper is as follows: the first chapter introduces the background of this paper, and reviews the current research situation of corporate governance and accounting information quality at home and abroad. Then it analyzes the influence mechanism of corporate governance structure on the quality of accounting information disclosure in theory; chapter three introduces the beginning and end of the case of investment violation information disclosure; the fourth chapter uses the results of theoretical analysis in chapter two. From the perspective of corporate governance, this paper deeply analyzes the reasons of the information disclosure cases and puts forward suggestions for improvement. The fifth chapter is the inspiration and limitations of this paper. This paper argues that the decentralized ownership structure of Boyuan Investment Company is the deep reason for the illegal information disclosure. This kind of ownership structure leads to the mismatch between the control right of the company and the share right of residual income. When the company faces the pressure of capital market threshold, the actual controller either chooses the escape strategy, which shows that the company frequently changes its ownership. Either through accounting fraud to relieve the pressure, desperate. In order to improve the quality of corporate information disclosure, the suggestions of this paper are: first, to improve the degree of ownership concentration, that is, to increase the matching degree between control right and residual income sharing right; second, to increase the shareholding ratio of institutional investors; Third, to give full play to the system of independent directors and the system of the board of supervisors to the system of checks and balances on actual controllers; fourth, to increase the cost of information disclosure by listed companies in violation of regulations, that is, the CSRC should increase penalties for listed companies that violate the disclosure of information. To increase the executive power of the delisting system.
【学位授予单位】：吉林财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F832.39;F275

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