控股家族的“垂帘听政”与公司财务决策

发布时间：2018-08-30 10:30

【摘要】：当控股家族退居"幕后"时,非家族成员担任公司董事长使得家族声誉和公司形象分离,由此可能加剧控股股东与中小股东的利益冲突。本文以1999~2014年中国上市家族企业为样本,较为深入地研究了控股家族退居"幕后"对公司财务决策的影响。实证检验结果表明,与由实际控制人家族成员担任董事长的企业相比,非家族成员担任董事长企业的资本支出更少、创新水平更低、负债比例更高、债务期限结构更长、现金持有更多、股利支付更少。进一步地,本文发现当家族成员不担任董事长时,资金占用、关联交易等控股股东私利行为更多;管理层的薪酬—业绩敏感性、离职—业绩敏感性较低而在职消费更高,表明控股股东与公司管理层存在合谋的倾向;而且,家族成员不担任董事长的企业的业绩表现要劣于家族成员任董事长的企业。这些研究结论表明,控股家族退居"幕后"降低了家族声誉受损成本,恶化了公司的代理问题,从而扭曲了公司财务决策。本文从一个新的视角检验了家族涉入对公司财务决策的影响,为家族与非家族成员参与企业财务决策的差异提供了新的解释。
[Abstract]:When the controlling family retreats behind the scenes, the non-family members as chairman of the company separate the reputation of the family from the image of the company, which may aggravate the conflict of interest between the controlling shareholder and the minority shareholder. Based on the sample of Chinese listed family enterprises from 1999 to 2014, this paper makes a deep study of the influence of the "behind-the-scenes" retirement of the holding family on the financial decision of the company. The empirical results show that the non-family members have less capital expenditure, lower level of innovation, higher debt ratio and longer debt maturity structure than those with actual controller family members as chairman, while non-family members have less capital expenditure, lower innovation level, higher debt ratio and longer debt maturity structure. More cash and less dividend payments. Furthermore, this paper finds that when the family members are not chairman, the controlling shareholders, such as capital occupation and related party transactions, are more self-interested; the management is more sensitive to compensation and performance, less sensitive to separation and performance, and higher in terms of in-service consumption. This indicates that the controlling shareholders have a tendency to collude with the management of the company, and that the performance of the enterprises whose family members are not chairman is worse than that of the enterprises where the family members are the chairman. These findings suggest that the "behind-the-scenes" retreat of the controlling family reduces the cost of the family's reputation damage, exacerbates the agency problem and distorts the company's financial decisions. This paper examines the influence of family involvement on corporate financial decisions from a new perspective and provides a new explanation for the differences between family and non-family members in financial decisions.
【作者单位】：中国人民大学商学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71432008) 中国人民大学科学研究基金(中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助)项目(17XNH074)的阶段性成果
【分类号】：F271;F275;F832.51

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