监事会特征对高管运气薪酬的影响研究

发布时间：2018-10-16 14:06

【摘要】：公平、合理、有效的薪酬激励机制是公司生存、发展壮大的必备要素。学者对高管薪酬的研究由来已久,且形成了众多研究成果。但无论是在学术界还是在实务界,对高管薪酬的关注却从未减少。越来越多的学者研究发现,薪酬契约并未很好地解决委托代理问题,相反其设置过程产生了新的代理问题:高管可以运用自身权力自设薪酬。近些年,高管“天价薪酬”的出现越来越引起人们对高管薪酬合理性、有效性的思考。Bertrand和Mullainatha于2001年提出“运气薪酬”的概念,从这一角度对高管薪酬进行合理性、有效性检验。按照他们的定义,运气薪酬指企业为超出高管控制的可观测要素导致的业绩变动,而向高管支付的酬劳。本文以最优契约理论为理论出发点,以行业加权平均收益率ROA(剔除公司自身影响)作为运气的衡量工具,检验企业向高管支付的薪酬中是否含有运气成份,以及通过改善监事会结构能否降低高管的运气薪酬。本文的理论部分阐述了薪酬作为解决委托代理问题契约所依赖的理论基础——信息不对称理论、委托代理理论、最优契约理论、管理层权力理论。本文的实证部分,以2007-2015年间所有上市公司数据(共9984个数据)形成非平衡面板数据,用STATA12统计软件,通过2SLS回归,研究了我国上市公司高管薪酬与运气之间的关系,并以监事会规模、监事会持股比例、未领取薪酬的监事人数作为监事会的代理变量,研究监事会与高管运气薪酬的关系。本文的研究结论主要有以下三点:(1)我国上市公司普遍向高管支付了运气薪酬,且运气对高管薪酬的影响仅次于高管才能对高管薪酬的影响。总体来看,业绩好的公司中,运气对高管薪酬的影响更大。(2)监事会规模、监事会持股比例、未领取薪酬的监事人数能够影响高管运气薪酬。监事会保持在正常规模3人时,监事会对高管运气薪酬具有较好的治理作用。监事会持股比例越多,未领取薪酬的监事人数越少,高管运气薪酬越低。(3)业绩比较好的公司中,监事会规模、未领取薪酬的监事人数对高管运气薪酬的治理作用更强,而在业绩比较差的公司中,监事会持股比例对高管运气薪酬的治理作用更强。最后,根据实证结果,本文认为,由于每个公司多元化、规模等具体情况存在较大差异,因此对监事会的规模要求也不同。但是对于一般公司来说,将监事会规模保持在正常水平3人左右并提高监事会持股比例、减少监事会中未领取薪酬的监事人数,可以有效改善监事会对高管运气薪酬的治理作用。
[Abstract]:Fair, reasonable and effective salary incentive mechanism is the essential factor for the survival and development of the company. Scholars' research on executive compensation has a long history, and has formed a lot of research results. But whether in academia or in practice, the focus on executive compensation has never diminished. More and more scholars have found that the compensation contract does not solve the principal-agent problem very well, on the contrary, the process of setting up it has created a new agency problem: executives can use their own power to set up their own compensation. In recent years, the appearance of "sky-high compensation" has caused more and more people to think about the rationality and effectiveness of executive compensation. Bertrand and Mullainatha put forward the concept of "luck compensation" in 2001, from which the rationality and effectiveness of executive compensation are tested. By their definition, luck pay is the remuneration that companies pay executives for changes in performance caused by observable elements beyond the control of their executives. Based on the optimal contract theory and the industry-weighted average rate of return (ROA) as a measure of luck, this paper examines whether the compensation paid to senior executives contains luck. And by improving the structure of the board of supervisors can reduce executive luck pay. The theoretical part of this paper expounds the compensation as the theoretical basis for solving the principal-agent problem contract-information asymmetry theory, principal-agent theory, optimal contract theory, management power theory. In the empirical part of this paper, using the data of all listed companies (9984 data) from 2007 to 2015 to form non-equilibrium panel data, using STATA12 statistical software and 2SLS regression, the relationship between executive compensation and luck of listed companies in China is studied. Taking the scale of the board of supervisors, the proportion of the board of supervisors holding shares and the number of supervisors who have not received compensation as the proxy variables of the board of supervisors, the relationship between the board of supervisors and the compensation of executive luck is studied. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: (1) China's listed companies generally pay executive compensation, and the impact of luck on executive compensation is second only to that of executive talent. Overall, luck has a greater impact on executive compensation in companies with good performance. (2) the size of the board of supervisors, the proportion of shares held by the board of supervisors, and the number of supervisors who do not receive compensation can affect executive luck pay. When the board of supervisors remains in the normal size of 3 people, the board of supervisors has a good governance role on executive luck compensation. The more the share of the board of supervisors, the less the number of supervisors who do not receive compensation, and the lower the compensation of executives' luck. (3) in the companies with better performance, the size of the board of supervisors and the number of supervisors who do not receive compensation have a stronger effect on the governance of executive luck compensation. In companies with poor performance, the proportion of board of supervisors has a stronger governance effect on executive luck compensation. Finally, according to the empirical results, this paper argues that because of the diversity of each company, the size of the board of supervisors is different. But for ordinary companies, we should keep the size of the board of supervisors at a normal level of about 3 people and increase the proportion of shares held by the board of supervisors, so as to reduce the number of unpaid supervisors on the board of supervisors. Can effectively improve the board of supervisors on executive luck compensation governance role.
【学位授予单位】：山东师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F271;F272.92

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