管理层自利、外部监督与盈利预测偏差

发布时间：2018-11-14 08:26

【摘要】：管理层发布的盈利预测反映了企业未来的盈利前景,可能会对公司股票价格产生重要影响。作为企业信息最核心的知情者,管理层理应发布较为准确的盈利预测。然而,很多公司盈利预测却与真实盈利存在较大偏差。那么,管理层是否因为自利动机(比如增减持公司股票)而有意发布有偏差的盈利预测呢?本文以2007年至2013年沪深A股上市公司数据为样本,研究发现:当管理层持股变化时,其更可能发布有偏差的盈利预测。进一步检验外部监督作用的调节效应时发现:当监管机构监督、分析师监督或媒体监督力度较强时,管理层持股变化对盈利预测偏差的正向影响较弱。上述发现意味着,主管部门应将目前孤立进行的预测信息监管和内部人交易监管联系起来一并监管。
[Abstract]:Earnings forecasts issued by management reflect future earnings prospects and could have a significant impact on stock prices. As the core of enterprise information, management should issue more accurate profit forecast. However, many company profit forecast and the real profit existence big deviation. So is management interested in issuing biased earnings forecasts because of self-interest motivations, such as increasing or decreasing holdings of company shares? Based on the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2013, this paper finds that when management shares change, they are more likely to issue biased profit forecasts. When the regulatory effect of the external supervision is further tested, it is found that when the supervision of the regulators, analysts or the media is stronger, the positive effect of the change of management stock ownership on the deviation of earnings forecast is weak. The findings suggest that authorities should link the current isolated regulation of predictive information with the regulation of insider transactions.
【作者单位】：东北财经大学会计学院/中国内部控制研究中心;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金青年项目(12CGL027) 东北财经大学优秀科研创新人才项目(DUFE2015R08)的资助
【分类号】：F275;F272.91

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