上市公司股权激励的市场时机选择实证研究
发布时间：2019-06-25 15:21
【摘要】：企业所有者与管理者利益冲突产生了委托-代理问题,股权激励正是为解决此问题被提出来的。在股权激励计划中,行权价格(授予价格)的高低关系着管理者的成本收益,而行权价格的设定与资本市场股价息息相关。在我国现有的资本市场环境下,我国股票市场尚不成熟,投资者羊群行为严重,大量的同向买卖导致股价的大涨大跌,造成股价被高估或者被低估。作为内部人的公司管理者对企业价值有一个更清醒的认识,能较为理性地认识到资本市场股价对企业内在价值的偏离。我们可以设想:公司高管作为股权激励方案的制定者与实施者,在追求自身利益最大化的驱动下,是否会利用股价与企业内在价值的偏离为自己谋取福利:在股价被高估时降低股权激励强度,在股价被低估时提高股权激励强度,使得股权激励难以发挥应用的激励作用,甚至会扩大代理问题,这是我们这篇研究主要关心的问题。有效的公司治理制度能对高管的择机自利行为起到监督作用,发挥股权激励的激励与监督作用。独立董事制度作为公司治理非常重要的制度构成,本文也探究了独立董事制度在股权激励中的必要性。基于上述问题,本文以2009年至2015年沪深两市(主板、中小板与创业板)665家企业公布的802起股权激励方案为研究样本,通过建立多元回归模型,利用市账比与股权激励草案公布前一年的股票年累积月度收益作为市场时机的替代变量,检验资本市场股价表现对股权激励强度的影响,即验证股权激励中高管的择机行为;同时检验公司治理水平对股权激励高管择机自利行为的约束机制。研究发现:(1)我国股权激励草案存在市场时机选择行为,股价被低估时,股权激励强度大;股价被高估时,股权激励强度小;(2)我国的独立董事制度在股权激励草案的制定实施过程中起到了对高管的有效监督作用,独立董事比例较高的样本中不存在高管的择机自利行为,这说明我国独立董事制度建设取得一定效果;(3)相比较国有企业来说,民营企业股权激励强度更高;由于管理层选拔机制与股权激励机制实施的差异性导致我国民营企业股权激励中高管的择机自利行为更明显。
[Abstract]:The conflict of interest between enterprise owners and managers gives rise to the principal-agent problem, and equity incentive is proposed to solve this problem. In the equity incentive plan, the price of exercise (award price) is related to the cost and benefit of managers, and the setting of exercise price is closely related to the stock price of capital market. In the existing capital market environment of our country, the stock market of our country is not yet mature, the herding behavior of investors is serious, a large number of co-trading leads to the rise and fall of the stock price, resulting in the stock price being overvalued or undervalued. As insiders, the managers of the company have a more clear understanding of the value of the enterprise, and can reasonably realize the deviation of the capital market stock price from the intrinsic value of the enterprise. We can imagine whether the executives, as the makers and implementers of the equity incentive scheme, will take advantage of the deviation between the stock price and the intrinsic value of the enterprise to seek their own benefits under the drive of pursuing the maximization of their own interests: to reduce the intensity of the equity incentive when the stock price is overvalued, to increase the intensity of the equity incentive when the stock price is undervalued, so that it is difficult for the equity incentive to play an applied incentive role, and even to expand the agency problem. This is the main concern of our study. Effective corporate governance system can play a supervisory role in the choice of opportunity and self-interest behavior of executives, and give full play to the incentive and supervision role of equity incentive. As a very important system of corporate governance, this paper also explores the necessity of independent director system in equity incentive. Based on the above problems, this paper takes 802 equity incentive schemes published by 665 enterprises in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets (main board, small and medium-sized board and gem) from 2009 to 2015 as research samples, and tests the influence of capital market stock price performance on equity incentive intensity by establishing multiple regression model and using the cumulative monthly return of stock year before the announcement of market-account ratio and equity incentive draft as an alternative variable of market timing. That is, to verify the opportunity selection behavior of executives in equity incentive; At the same time, it tests the restraint mechanism of corporate governance level on the behavior of equity incentive executives to choose their own interests. It is found that: (1) there is market timing behavior in the draft equity incentive in China, when the stock price is undervalued, the intensity of equity incentive is large, when the stock price is overvalued, the intensity of equity incentive is small; (2) in the process of formulating and implementing the draft equity incentive, the independent director system in our country plays an effective role in supervising the senior executives, and there is no opportunity self-interest behavior among the samples with a high proportion of independent directors, which indicates that the construction of the independent director system in our country has achieved some results. (3) compared with the state-owned enterprises, the equity incentive intensity of the private enterprises is higher; Due to the difference between the implementation of management selection mechanism and equity incentive mechanism, the opportunity self-interest behavior of executives in equity incentive of private enterprises in China is more obvious.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.92
[Abstract]:The conflict of interest between enterprise owners and managers gives rise to the principal-agent problem, and equity incentive is proposed to solve this problem. In the equity incentive plan, the price of exercise (award price) is related to the cost and benefit of managers, and the setting of exercise price is closely related to the stock price of capital market. In the existing capital market environment of our country, the stock market of our country is not yet mature, the herding behavior of investors is serious, a large number of co-trading leads to the rise and fall of the stock price, resulting in the stock price being overvalued or undervalued. As insiders, the managers of the company have a more clear understanding of the value of the enterprise, and can reasonably realize the deviation of the capital market stock price from the intrinsic value of the enterprise. We can imagine whether the executives, as the makers and implementers of the equity incentive scheme, will take advantage of the deviation between the stock price and the intrinsic value of the enterprise to seek their own benefits under the drive of pursuing the maximization of their own interests: to reduce the intensity of the equity incentive when the stock price is overvalued, to increase the intensity of the equity incentive when the stock price is undervalued, so that it is difficult for the equity incentive to play an applied incentive role, and even to expand the agency problem. This is the main concern of our study. Effective corporate governance system can play a supervisory role in the choice of opportunity and self-interest behavior of executives, and give full play to the incentive and supervision role of equity incentive. As a very important system of corporate governance, this paper also explores the necessity of independent director system in equity incentive. Based on the above problems, this paper takes 802 equity incentive schemes published by 665 enterprises in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets (main board, small and medium-sized board and gem) from 2009 to 2015 as research samples, and tests the influence of capital market stock price performance on equity incentive intensity by establishing multiple regression model and using the cumulative monthly return of stock year before the announcement of market-account ratio and equity incentive draft as an alternative variable of market timing. That is, to verify the opportunity selection behavior of executives in equity incentive; At the same time, it tests the restraint mechanism of corporate governance level on the behavior of equity incentive executives to choose their own interests. It is found that: (1) there is market timing behavior in the draft equity incentive in China, when the stock price is undervalued, the intensity of equity incentive is large, when the stock price is overvalued, the intensity of equity incentive is small; (2) in the process of formulating and implementing the draft equity incentive, the independent director system in our country plays an effective role in supervising the senior executives, and there is no opportunity self-interest behavior among the samples with a high proportion of independent directors, which indicates that the construction of the independent director system in our country has achieved some results. (3) compared with the state-owned enterprises, the equity incentive intensity of the private enterprises is higher; Due to the difference between the implementation of management selection mechanism and equity incentive mechanism, the opportunity self-interest behavior of executives in equity incentive of private enterprises in China is more obvious.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.92
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