政府管制、国企分红与企业创新

发布时间：2019-08-16 19:38

【摘要】：基于政府对国有企业管制的制度背景,采用2008-2015年中国国有上市公司的数据对政府管制与国有企业财务决策行为、股利无关理论以及管理层短视假说进行实证检验。研究发现,管制扭曲了国有企业财务决策行为,管制程度较轻的国有企业分红意愿与分红水平均较高。进一步研究发现,中央控制企业比地方国有企业更多地参与研发活动,分红意愿越强与比例越高的国有企业更多地制定研发决策,创新投入的比例更高,中央控制强化了两者之间的关系。研究结果拒绝了股利无关理论和管理者短视假说,并为实施RD费用有条件资本化的准则提供支持。研究为《中共中央、国务院关于深化国有企业改革的指导意见》的相关内容提供了经验证据,为进一步深化国有企业改革提供了政策建议。
[Abstract]:Based on the institutional background of government regulation of state-owned enterprises, the data of state-owned listed companies in China from 2008 to 2015 are used to test the theory of government regulation and financial decision-making behavior of state-owned enterprises, dividend relevance theory and management shortsightedness hypothesis. It is found that regulation distorts the financial decision-making behavior of state-owned enterprises, and the willingness to pay dividends and the average dividend water of state-owned enterprises with lighter degree of regulation are higher on average. It is found that the central control enterprises are more involved in R & D activities than the local state-owned enterprises, the stronger the willingness to pay dividends and the higher the proportion of state-owned enterprises making R & D decisions, the higher the proportion of innovation investment, and the stronger the relationship between the two. The results reject the dividend independence theory and the short-sighted hypothesis of managers, and provide support for the implementation of the criterion of conditional capitalization of RD costs. The study provides empirical evidence for the relevant contents of the guiding opinions of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on deepening the Reform of State-owned Enterprises, and provides policy suggestions for further deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises.
【作者单位】：绵阳师范学院经济与管理学院;西南财经大学会计学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金重大项目“会计信息在宏观经济分析与预测中的应用价值及其实现方式研究”(16AJY004)
【分类号】：F273.1;F275;F276.1

【相似文献】