我国国有电信业竞争对移动网络投资及效率影响研究

发布时间：2018-03-28 13:04

本文选题：网络投资　切入点：竞争结构　出处：《北京邮电大学》2012年博士论文

【摘要】：电信业作为基础设施产业,网络投资水平和网络绩效表现在市场竞争中起决定性作用。以往研究认为垄断经营会导致网络投资不足和效率低下,全球范围内的改革实践也表明电信业私有化和市场化改革可以同时促进网络投资和提升效率。我国电信业虽然己进行了部分上市私有化和市场化改革,但市场竞争行为却发生在同一国有投资主体内的电信运营商间,这样的市场化改革模式在全球电信市场中尚属特例。虽然该模式带来了我国电信业,特别是移动通信业的高速发展,但移动通信市场“竞争结构失衡”和“网络过度投资”两大问题也日益凸显。然而,我国作为全球最大的移动通信市场,其市场竞争、网络投资和网络效率间关系尚未被研究,而我国电信运营商特有的同一国有投资主体的所有权性质的潜在影响也未被考虑。本文在产业组织理论S-C-P范式——即市场结构(Market Structure)、市场行为(Market Conduct)、市场绩效(Market Performance)——三者间关系基础上纳入所有权性质因素构建整体研究框架,并利用2003-2010年我国电信业省际移动通信发展数据构建实证分析模型,分析我国移动通信市场竞争结构、网络投资行为、网络资源利用效率三者间关系,并深入分析所有权对三者间关系的影响机理。首先,结合国有电信运营商预算软约束理论和以往电信业竞争与投资间关系研究结论,本文首次提出同一国有投资主体下电信运营商市场竞争结构和网络投资关系的理论假设,并通过构建基于固定效应的静态面板数据和基于广义矩估计(GMM)的动态面板数据回归模型对假设进行验证。结果一致表明：我国移动通信市场竞争结构集中度与移动网络投资正相关。相关实证结果验证了本文所提出理论假设的正确性,即在同一国有投资主体内引入竞争时,不均衡的市场竞争结构会导致移动网络投资规模增加。这与以往均衡性市场结构有利于网络投资的理论和基于其他国家及地区的实证研究结果均相悖。本文分析指出,我国移动市场竞争结构和网络投资行为间所表现出的特殊关系,根源在于同一国有投资主体下的国有电信运营商引入竞争后,不均衡的市场竞争结构会使电信运营商固有的预算软约束问题显性化,预算软约束问题会提升非主导运营商扩大投资来提升网络覆盖以争夺市场份额的激励,而政府对主导运营商施加的政策性干预反而会使主导运营商同样出现预算软约束甚至棘轮效应问题,最终使电信运营商陷入“网络投资战”。其次,本文进一步分析同一国有投资主体下电信运营商间市场竞争结构失衡所引发网络投资的资源利用效率,即分析市场竞争结构和网络资源利用效率之间的关系。考虑到移动网络特有的多层结构特征以及核心网(交换机)和接入网(基站和话音信道)投资需求的差异性,本文首次利用基于松弛变量测度的数据包络分析模型(DEA-SBM)构建移动网络整体效率和各层网络要素利用率测度。测度结果显示：我国移动网络整体效率不高,投入要素核心网利用率较高,而接入网利用率偏低,且均具有明显的东中西部经济区域差异性,东部地区各项效率值均显著高于中西部地区。此后,在移动网络整体效率和各层网络要素利用率评价结果基础上,通过构建固定效应和Tobit面板数据回归模型检验市场竞争结构与各类网络效率的关系。实证结果显示：市场竞争结构失衡不利于移动网络整体效率；分层来看,市场竞争结构失衡也不利于核心网利用率,但有利于接入网利用率。最后,研究结论表明：在同一国有投资主体下不均衡的市场竞争结构虽激发网络投资但网络效率低下,意味着严重失衡的移动市场竞争结构和移动网络过度投资与重复建设现象间存在一定程度的关联,即当前市场竞争结构未能在促进网络投资与提升资源效率间实现平衡。因此,在既定所有权结构下继续促进市场竞争结构均衡与公平有效是必要的；但考虑当前移动市场互不共享的数网竞争模式,均衡竞争结构反而会导致接入网利用率降低,因此需同时加强网络共建共享特别是3G大规模建设初期；长期来看,推动电信业投资主体多元化以及实现网业分离,以此削弱国有电信运营商在竞争中对网络资源的依赖,并不断完善电信管制机制与政策将有利于提升电信业长远发展。
[Abstract]:As the telecommunications infrastructure industry, network investment and network performance play a decisive role in the market competition. Previous studies that monopoly will lead to insufficient investment and low efficiency of the network, the practice of reform within the scope of the global telecommunications industry also shows that privatization and marketization reform can also promote the network investment and improve the efficiency of China Telecom. Although the industry has been listed part of privatization and marketization reform, but the market competition behavior has occurred in the same state-owned investment entities within the telecom operators, so the market reform is the special pattern in the global telecommunications market. Although this model has brought China's telecom industry, especially the rapid development of mobile communication industry, but the mobile communication market competition structure imbalance "and" network over investment "two big problems have become increasingly prominent. However, in China as the world's largest mobile. The relationship between credit market, market competition, network investment and network efficiency has not been studied yet, and the potential impact of China's telecom operators on the ownership nature of the same state-owned investment entity has not been considered.
Based on the S-C-P paradigm of industrial organization theory, the market structure, market behavior (Market Structure) (Market Conduct), market performance (Market Performance) - the relationship between the three on the basis of the nature of ownership into the factors of constructing the overall research framework, and using empirical analysis model of mobile telecommunication industry of our country provincial communications development 2003-2010 years of data, analysis the competition structure of mobile communication market in China, the efficiency of network investment behavior, the relationship between the three use of cyber source, and in-depth analysis of the mechanism of effect of ownership on the relationship between the three.
First of all, combined with the conclusion of the relationship between competition and investment of state-owned telecom operators, the soft budget constraint theory and previous telecom industry, theoretical assumptions this paper proposes for the first time the same state-owned investment entities of telecom operators market competition structure and network investment relationship, and constructs the static panel data fixed effects based on the generalized moment estimation (GMM) the dynamic panel data regression model to verify the hypothesis. The results showed that: the competition structure of China mobile communication market concentration and mobile network investment correlation. The empirical results verify the correctness of the theoretical hypothesis, namely the introduction of competition in the same state-owned investment main body, market competition structure is not balanced the mobile network will lead to larger investment. This is conducive to the network investment and previous equilibrium market structure theory and Empirical Study Based on other countries and regions The results are inconsistent. This paper points out that the special relationship between China's mobile market competition structure and investment behavior between the network show, is the source of state-owned telecom operators with a state-owned investment entities under the introduction of competition, the soft budget constraint problem of market competition structure is not balanced will enable telecom operators inherent dominance that soft budget constraint will increase the non dominant operators to expand investment to improve the network coverage to compete for market share incentive, and government policy intervention of leading operators applied but will make the leading operators also budget constraint or ratchet effect, and ultimately enable telecom operators in the network investment war. "
Secondly, this paper further analyzes the telecom market competition between the investment structure imbalance caused by the network resource utilization efficiency of the same state-owned investment entities, namely the relationship between the efficiency analysis of market structure and cyber source. Considering the multi-layer mobile network specific structural features and core network (PBX) and access network (base station and voice channel) differences in investment demand, the data envelopment analysis model based on the measure of using slack variables for the first time (DEA-SBM) to construct the mobile network and the overall efficiency of each layer of network elements to measure utilization. The results showed that: China's mobile network overall efficiency is not high, input core network utilization rate is higher, and the access network utilization rate low, and there are differences in eastern and western economic area obviously, the efficiency of the eastern region were significantly higher than the Midwest. Since then, in the mobile network The overall efficiency and the utilization rate of each layer of network elements based on the evaluation results, through the construction of fixed effects and Tobit panel data regression model to test the market competition structure and efficiency of various types of network relationship. The empirical results show that: the market competition structure imbalance is not conducive to the overall efficiency of the mobile network; hierarchical view, market competition structure imbalance is not conducive to the core network utilization rate but, to access network utilization.
Finally, the conclusion of the study shows that: the market competition structure in the same state investors not balanced although stimulate network investment but the network efficiency is low, means that there exists a certain degree of correlation serious imbalance in the mobile market competition structure and mobile network over investment and repeated construction phenomenon, namely the market competition structure failed to promote the network investment and to achieve a balance between improving resource efficiency. Therefore, in the established ownership structure to continue to promote the balanced and fair and effective market competition structure is necessary; but considering the number of the current mobile network market mutual sharing competition mode, balanced competition structure will result in reduction of access network utilization, and therefore need to strengthen the network sharing especially 3G the large-scale construction period; the long term, to promote the diversification of investment subject and telecommunication network isolation, thus weakening the state-owned telecom operators The dependence on the network resources in the competition and the continuous improvement of the telecommunication control mechanism and policy will help to improve the long-term development of the telecommunication industry.

【学位授予单位】：北京邮电大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F49;F626

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