乐视网大股东减持公司股份行为的案例研究

发布时间：2018-06-07 09:40

本文选题：大股东减持 + 减持时机　；参考：《江西财经大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：我国实施的股权分置改革制度改变了上市公司大股东的获利方式。他们的获利途径从之前单纯的依赖公司开始逐渐转向证券市场,获利的多少也逐渐变成了由证券市场和上市公司共同决定。但是我国证券市场目前还正在发展阶段,相关法律法规还不完善,市场内的信息也有着不对称的特性。这使得大股东在提前知晓公司经营不善的情况下,多数会选择大量抛售股票以获取更多收益,而不是主动发现并解决公司问题。大股东的这种行为不仅损害了公司的声誉,给公司的经营发展带来负面影响,同时也让国内的众多中小股东对证券市场失去信心,不利于市场有秩序的发展。本文在委托代理理论、信息不对称理论和公司治理理论的基础上,选择乐视网为具体案例,分析乐视网大股东减少手中持有股份行为的动机和时机,以及减持行为的效果,得出结论和启示。全文一共有六个部分。第一部分是引言。主要介绍了本文的研究背景和意义,归纳了国内外学者对于大股东减持行为的动因和市场反应的研究现状,并介绍了本文的研究思路和研究方法。第二部分是大股东减持行为的理论概述。该部分介绍了大股东减持的定义和相关法律规定,同时也阐述了上市公司大股东减持行为的时机、动机和对股东财富的影响的理论基础。第三部分是乐视网大股东减持的案例介绍。该部分先介绍了乐视网减持前的经营状况、财务状况和外部环境,然后介绍了乐视网大股东减持的过程,包括其信息披露、具体减持方案以及其他与减持有关的事项。第四部分为乐视网大股东减持行为的动机和时机分析。该部分结合之前国内外学者的研究理论,对乐视网大股东减持行为的动机和时机进行了分析。第五部分为乐视网大股东减持行为的效果分析。这部分主要从减持行为带来的经济后果,减持行为对公司财务指标的影响以及减持行为对公司股东的影响三个方面进行分析。第六部分为研究结论和启示。根据前五部分的归纳分析得出结论,并提出具有参考价值的建议。本文从乐视网大股东减持的行为出发,分析乐视网大股东减持的动机、时机和减持带来的经济后果。通过分析发现乐视网大股东减持行为的动机表面上是缓解公司资金短缺,实际的动机是在信息不对称情况下大股东想要获取超额收益。除此之外,减持期间还伴随着员工股权激励、配股等一系列股权增发行为,可见乐视网大股东大量减持股份的原因并不完全是公告中披露的那样。在分析了乐视网大股东减持行为之后,本文发现上市公司如果想要稳定健康地发展,一定要有一个良好且有效的公司内部治理结构。只有公司内部各管理层相互约束,公司才能够长远地发展下去。除此之外,相关单位应该加强对大股东减持行为的预披露相关规章的建设,完善其中的不足之处。同时也应该完善保护中小股东利益的法律法规。
[Abstract]:The reform of split share structure in China has changed the profit-making mode of major shareholders of listed companies. Their profit path from the former simple dependence on the company began to gradually shift to the securities market, the number of profits has gradually changed from the stock market and listed companies to decide. However, the securities market of our country is still in the developing stage, the relevant laws and regulations are not perfect, the information in the market also has the asymmetry characteristic. This allows the majority of shareholders to sell stocks in advance to earn more if they are aware of the company's mismanagement, rather than to actively identify and solve the company's problems. This behavior of large shareholders not only damages the reputation of the company and has a negative impact on the development of the company, but also makes a large number of minority shareholders lose confidence in the securities market, which is not conducive to the orderly development of the market. On the basis of principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory and corporate governance theory, this paper chooses Letv net as a specific case to analyze the motivation and timing of Letv net major shareholders to reduce their shareholding behavior, as well as the effect of reduction behavior. Draw conclusions and enlightenments. There are six parts in this paper. The first part is the introduction. This paper mainly introduces the research background and significance of this paper, summarizes the domestic and foreign scholars' research on the motivation and market reaction of the behavior of large shareholder reduction, and introduces the research ideas and research methods of this paper. The second part is the theoretical overview of the behavior of major shareholder reduction. This part introduces the definition and relevant legal provisions of the reduction of large shareholders, and also expounds the timing, motivation and the theoretical basis of the influence on the wealth of shareholders of listed companies. The third part is the Letv net big shareholder reduces the case introduction. This part first introduces the operating situation, financial situation and external environment before Letv net reduction, then introduces the process of Letv net major shareholder reduction, including its information disclosure, specific reduction scheme and other items related to reduction. The fourth part is the motive and opportunity analysis of Letv net major shareholder's reduction behavior. In this part, the motivation and timing of Letv net major shareholder reduction are analyzed based on the previous theories of scholars at home and abroad. The fifth part is the effect analysis of Letv net major shareholder reduction behavior. This part mainly analyzes the economic consequences of the reduction behavior, the impact of the reduction behavior on the financial indicators of the company and the impact of the reduction behavior on the shareholders of the company. The sixth part is the research conclusion and enlightenment. The conclusion is drawn according to the analysis of the first five parts, and some valuable suggestions are put forward. This paper analyzes the motivation, timing and economic consequences of the reduction of Letv net major shareholders from the perspective of the behavior of the major shareholders of Letv net. Through analysis, it is found that the motivation of the reduction of Letv net shareholders is ostensibly to alleviate the capital shortage of the company, and the actual motivation is that the large shareholders want to obtain excess returns under the condition of asymmetric information. In addition, during the period of stock reduction accompanied by employee equity incentives, rights issues and other a series of additional equity behavior, it is clear that the large number of Letv shareholders to reduce the shares of the reasons is not exactly as disclosed in the announcement. After analyzing the behavior of large shareholder reduction in Letv net, this paper finds that if the listed company wants to develop steadily and healthily, it must have a good and effective internal governance structure. The company can develop in the long-term only if the internal management of the company restricts each other. In addition, relevant units should strengthen the construction of pre-disclosure regulations on the behavior of major shareholders reduction, and improve the deficiencies. At the same time, we should perfect the laws and regulations to protect the interests of minority shareholders.
【学位授予单位】：江西财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F832.51;F49;F275

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