行政分权与财政分权的不同效应:来自中国县域的经验证据

发布时间：2018-03-22 16:26

本文选题：行政分权　切入点：财政分权　出处：《世界经济》2014年10期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：本文利用中国"强县扩权"和"省直管县"两种政策试点,首次区分了行政分权和财政分权对县域经济增长影响的不同效果。研究结果表明:行政分权(强县扩权)通过吸引更多新企业、提高企业平均利润率来促进经济增长,财政分权(省直管县)则通过增加财政收入来刺激经济,但两种分权方式依旧是依靠投资拉动经济,并没有从本质上提升企业的生产率和资源配置效率。研究结果进一步表明,行政分权会产生正的外部性而财政分权的外部性为负,产生这一负外部性的原因可能是地级市对非省直管县的财政挤压加剧。因此政府可以尝试扩大行政分权的试点范围,而在实施财政分权时需注意其对周边县产生的负面影响。
[Abstract]:This paper makes use of the two kinds of policies of "strengthening county expansion" and "managing county directly by province" in China. For the first time, it distinguishes the different effects of administrative decentralization and fiscal decentralization on county economic growth. The results show that administrative decentralization promotes economic growth by attracting more new enterprises and increasing the average profit margin of enterprises. Fiscal decentralization (directly administered by provinces and counties) stimulates the economy by increasing fiscal revenue. However, the two ways of decentralization still rely on investment to stimulate the economy, and do not substantially improve the productivity and resource allocation efficiency of enterprises. Administrative decentralization will produce positive externalities while fiscal decentralization will be negative. This negative externality may be due to the intensified fiscal squeeze on counties not directly administered by provinces by prefecture-level municipalities. Therefore, the government can try to expand the scope of the pilot areas of administrative decentralization. In the implementation of fiscal decentralization, attention should be paid to its negative impact on the surrounding counties.
【作者单位】：清华大学经济管理学院;上海新金融研究院;北京大学光华管理学院;
【基金】：中国博士后科学基金特别资助(2014T70062) 博士后科学基金面上资助(2014M56009) 国家自然科学基金面上项目(71273014) 数量经济与数理金融教育部重点实验室(北京大学)的资助
【分类号】：D630;F812.7;F127

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