产业组织框架下的产品创新技术许可决策模型研究

发布时间：2018-04-16 15:34

本文选题：产品创新 + 技术许可　；参考：《华北电力大学》2013年博士论文

【摘要】：长期以来,国内外学者对经济增长的影响因素已进行了大量的实证研究,结果表明,随着时间的推移,技术进步在经济增长中的作用日益提高,并逐步取代了生产要素投入在经济增长中的主导地位。要保持我国的经济持续高速增长,就必须加强技术进步的力度,转变经济增长方式,提高技术创新能力,使经济增长逐步实现从要素驱动型向创新驱动型转变。知识和技术的创新和创造性应用越来越成为当今知识经济时代技术进步、经济社会发展的推动力。创新的成果水平衡量指标专利尤其是对发明专利的创造、拥有和运用,成为一个企业乃至一个国家在竞争中获得优势的关键因素。然而,不容乐观的是,专利成果转化率并没有明显提高,大量专利得不到应用而成为“沉睡专利”,科技成果转化不成生产力。要彻底改变这种科技与经济脱节、科技向现实生产力转化能力薄弱的局面,充分发挥知识和技术在推动我国经济增长方式转变中的重要作用,需要积极研究和探讨我国的技术市场交易与科技成果转化。技术许可是在技术市场上实现技术交易的主要形式之一,是技术要素流动的一种重要方式,也是技术充分发挥其经济主导力量的主要路径。如何确定被转移技术的价格契约方式是技术许可决策的核心。因此,随着以创新为基础的市场竞争日益激烈、科技水平的快速提升以及世界范围内对知识产权保护的不断加强,在许多产业的技术转移及扩散过程中,技术许可将不可避免地发挥越来越重要的作用。技术许可价格决策过程是十分复杂和困难的。研究技术许可的内在价格决策行为无论对于提高企业、高校等市场主体的技术交易效率,促进科技成果向现实生产力转化,提高创新技术对于经济增长的贡献力,还是扩展技术许可契约理论研究的深度和广度都是有一定的价值的。本文提出产品创新技术许可策略理论,是考虑与产品创新技术许可活动相关的政府、研发者、许可方、被许可方以及消费者等决策主体,关于产品创新许可相关的技术获取模式、市场竞争结构、需求结构、产品耐用性、信息不对称、不确定性等因素作用下的系统性产业组织框架下的技术许可决策模型研究。其中,产品创新是技术创新的一种重要类型,实践数据表明,产品创新在技术创新中占据很大的比例。本文进行的主要工作如下： (1)比较分析了企业创新技术获取策略。针对现实经济中企业创新技术获取问题,首先运用包含创新及产出阶段的博弈模型分析了合作创新模式；然后构建了包含创新、许可及产出阶段的博弈模型,并根据模型重点比较分析了技术许可模式；最后比较分析得出企业较优的创新技术获取策略。 (2)研究了寡头垄断市场结构下质量提高型创新技术许可决策。按照典型寡头垄断市场结构Cournot(古诺)市场、Stackelberg(斯坦伯格)市场、Bertrand(伯川德)市场结构等,分别讨论了不同市场结构下质量提高型创新技术的许可决策问题。由于产品创新技术许可行为受到市场结构的影响,考虑了基于产量竞争的静态博弈和动态博弈模型,并分别比较不同市场结构下固定费用许可、提成许可、两部制许可的市场均衡,以及相应的最优许可决策及消费者剩余和社会剩余。同时,讨论了产品差异Bertrand竞争市场结构下质量提高型创新技术许可决策问题。 (3)论证了创新技术应用后,产品市场需求结构对质量提高型创新技术许可决策的影响。按照市场需求假设为线性市场需求、logit市场需求,分析不同市场需求条件下的质量提高型创新技术许可决策问题,并且讨论了许可方为同时参与市场竞争的内部创新者时的技术许可决策问题。其中,logit需求框架下的分析使得考虑新品牌产品相对于替代者的相对吸引力、边际成本、产品差异水平以及消费者偏好的差异对于创新技术许可决策的影响成为可能。 (4)研究了耐用品在纵向一体化结构情况下的创新技术许可相关决策问题。分析了创新产品是耐用品时,垄断市场结构对于创新技术许可决策的影响。在前人研究的基础上,结合上下游纵向独立产业和产品耐用性的分析思路,重点讨论了上游原料供应市场不完全竞争,即存在垄断势力时,下游两阶段耐用品独占垄断厂商的质量提高型和成本降低型技术创新激励,以及在此背景下外部创新者的最优许可方式的选择问题。由于完全竞争在现实世界中不可能也从来没有存在过,不完全竞争市场条件下的技术许可决策分析更具有现实意义。 (5)论证了信息不对称性对创新技术许可决策的影响。由产品创新者对创新技术的创新规模,及技术应用者对创新技术的应用价值,拥有私有信息而产生的产品创新技术的产品质量信息不对称,以及技术创新市场价值信息不对称情况下的技术许可决策比较分析,寻求信息不对称条件下的技术许可混同均衡、分离均衡以及对应的最优许可策略。 (6)提出了不确定性条件下产品创新技术许可相关的决策模型。分析新产品研发不确定性条件下同时考虑研发、事前许可、事后许可以及政府补贴的博弈模型,讨论了研发产品的差异性以及研发过程中的技术溢出效应对于不确定条件下政府研发补贴的影响。基于期权博弈建立了新产品创新面临的市场需求不确定条件下的技术许可决策模型。
[Abstract]:For a long time, domestic and foreign scholars on the influencing factors of economic growth has carried out empirical research, a large number of results show that with the passage of time, the role of technological progress in economic growth is increasing, and gradually replaced the input of production factors in the economic growth in the leading position. To maintain China's sustained and rapid economic growth and we must strengthen efforts in technological progress, change the mode of economic growth, improve the ability of technological innovation, economic growth and gradually realize the transition from factor driven to innovation driven. Knowledge and technology innovation and creative applications increasingly become the era of knowledge economy and technology progress, economic and social development impetus innovation indicators to measure the level of. Created especially for the patent invention patents, and has become a key factor in use, an enterprise and even a country to obtain the advantage in the competition. However, not Optimistic is that the patent conversion rate was not significantly increased, a large number of patent applications do not become "sleeping patents", the transformation of scientific and technological achievements into productive forces. To change the gap between science and technology and the economic situation thoroughly, weak ability of science and technology into practical productive forces, give full play an important role in promoting the knowledge and technology transformation in the mode of economic growth, need to actively study and explore the technology of our country market and the transformation of scientific and technological achievements.
Technology licensing is one of the main forms of technology trading in the technology market, is an important means of technology factor mobility, but also give full play to the main path leading technology strength of its economy. How to determine the price of contract transfer technology is the core technology licensing decision. Therefore, with the innovation based market competition intense, continue to strengthen the rapid technological upgrading of the world and within the scope of protection of intellectual property rights in many industries, technology transfer and diffusion process, technology licensing will inevitably play an increasingly important role. The technology licensing price decision process is very complicated and difficult. The price decision behavior of technology licensing for both to improve the enterprise, universities and other market players technology transaction efficiency, promote scientific and technological achievements into practical productive forces, improve the technology innovation for The contribution of economic growth, or the depth and breadth of the theory of expanding the theory of licensing contracts, is of certain value.
This product innovation licensing strategy theory, is to consider the related technology licensing and product innovation activities of the government, developers, Licensor, Licensee and consumer decision-making body, acquisition mode for product innovation licensing related technology, market competition structure, demand structure, product durability, information asymmetry, technology licensing decision model the system of industrial organization framework under uncertainty. Among them, product innovation is an important type of technological innovation, practical data show that the product innovation in technology innovation occupies a large proportion in the new. The main work of this paper is as follows:
(1) a comparative analysis of the strategy of acquiring enterprise innovation technology. Aiming at the problem of obtaining the real economy innovation technology, firstly using the game model including the innovation and output stage analysis of cooperative innovation mode; then constructs the game model including the innovation, licensing and output stage, and according to the model focus on comparative analysis of the mode of technology licensing; the comparative analysis of the enterprise technology innovation strategy of getting better.
(2) on the quality of the oligopoly market structure and improve the innovative technology licensing decision. According to the typical oligopoly market structure Cournot (Cournot) market, Stackelberg (Steinberg), Bertrand (Bo Chuande) market structure, are discussed under different market structure to improve the quality of innovative technology licensing decision problem. The behavior of innovation technology licensing products are influenced by the structure of the market, considering the static and dynamic game model based on output competition, and to compare the different market structures of fixed fee licensing, licensing, licensing two market equilibrium, and the corresponding optimal licensing decision and the consumer surplus and social surplus. At the same time, discusses the quality structure difference Bertrand product market competition to improve innovative technology licensing decision problems.
(3) demonstrates the application of innovative technology, product market demand structure to improve the quality of influence of innovative technology licensing decision. According to the market demand is assumed to be linear logit market demand, market demand, quality analysis of different market demand under the condition of improving innovation technology licensing decision problem, and discussed the Licensor for licensing decision problems at the same time to participate in the market competition inside innovators. Among them, logit demand analysis under the framework of the consideration of the new brand products relative to the attractiveness of alternatives marginal cost, differences in the level of product differentiation and consumer preferences for innovative technology licensing decision possible.
(4) research on innovative technology licensing related decision problems of durable goods in the vertical integration of the structure. The analysis of innovative products are durable goods, influence of monopoly market structure to the innovation of technology licensing decision. On the basis of previous studies, combined with the analysis of the longitudinal independent industry and product durability, focus on the upstream raw material supply market is not perfectly competitive, namely the existence of monopoly power, downstream of the two stage quality durable goods monopoly manufacturers improve the type and cost reducing technology innovation incentive, selection of optimal licensing and external innovation under the background of the competition. Due to completely impossible in the real world has never existed. Technology licensing, decision analysis of incomplete market conditions is more practical significance.
(5) demonstrates the impact of information asymmetry on innovation of technology licensing decision. By the innovator of products of innovation innovation scale, application value and application of innovative technology, product quality information asymmetry product innovation technology which has private information, comparative analysis of technology licensing decision and technology innovation market value of information asymmetry under the condition of seeking under the condition of asymmetric information technology licensing pooling equilibrium separating equilibrium and the corresponding optimal licensing strategy.
(6) this paper proposes a decision model related to product innovation technology licensing under uncertainty analysis. The research and development of new products under uncertainty and consider the development, prior permission, after the game model permit and government subsidies, discusses the technology spillover effect of differences in product research and development process for the uncertain impact of government R & D the subsidy conditions. Based on option game built facing new product innovation and market demand uncertainty decision-making model under the condition of technology licensing.

【学位授予单位】：华北电力大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F124.3

【参考文献】