政府间转移支付、预算软约束与地区外溢
发布时间：2018-07-17 16:39
【摘要】：文章根据中国2002—2012年31个省区的面板数据,运用一步系统广义矩(sysGMM)回归方法,建立转移支付预期实证模型,对转移支付是否诱发地方政府的预算软约束行为及其外溢范围以及其与税收竞争和财政竞争的综合影响进行了系统的实证研究。研究发现:转移支付预算软约束问题并非发生于个别省份,争夺转移支付的连锁反应促使各地区共同参与从而形成策略互补性质的竞争。其不仅对地方政府自主筹资产生了负面激励,同时在控制了自有财力下降的潜在影响和转移支付的"粘蝇纸效应"后,仍能够发现预算软约束对财政支出的扩张效应。这种支出扩张中体现了转移支付预算软约束与财政竞争之间的替代效应和收入效应的共同影响。
[Abstract]:Based on the panel data of 31 provinces and regions in China from 2002 to 2012, the empirical model of expected transfer payment is established by using the SysGMM regression method. This paper makes a systematic and empirical study on whether transfer payment induces soft budget constraint behavior of local government and its spillover scope and its comprehensive influence on tax competition and fiscal competition. It is found that the soft constraint problem of transfer payment budget does not occur in individual provinces, and the chain reaction of competition for transfer payment urges all regions to participate together, thus forming the competition with complementary strategies. It not only has negative incentives for local governments to raise funds independently, but also controls the potential effects of the decline of their own financial resources and the "slimy paper effect" of transfer payments, and can still find the expansion effect of soft budgetary constraints on fiscal expenditure. This kind of expenditure expansion reflects the effect of substitution effect and income effect between soft constraint of transfer payment budget and financial competition.
【作者单位】： 南京财经大学财政与税务学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71063023、71203089) 江苏省高校“青蓝工程”人才资助项目 江苏省高校优势学科建设工程项目(PAPD)的资助
【分类号】：F812.45;F124;F224
[Abstract]:Based on the panel data of 31 provinces and regions in China from 2002 to 2012, the empirical model of expected transfer payment is established by using the SysGMM regression method. This paper makes a systematic and empirical study on whether transfer payment induces soft budget constraint behavior of local government and its spillover scope and its comprehensive influence on tax competition and fiscal competition. It is found that the soft constraint problem of transfer payment budget does not occur in individual provinces, and the chain reaction of competition for transfer payment urges all regions to participate together, thus forming the competition with complementary strategies. It not only has negative incentives for local governments to raise funds independently, but also controls the potential effects of the decline of their own financial resources and the "slimy paper effect" of transfer payments, and can still find the expansion effect of soft budgetary constraints on fiscal expenditure. This kind of expenditure expansion reflects the effect of substitution effect and income effect between soft constraint of transfer payment budget and financial competition.
【作者单位】： 南京财经大学财政与税务学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71063023、71203089) 江苏省高校“青蓝工程”人才资助项目 江苏省高校优势学科建设工程项目(PAPD)的资助
【分类号】：F812.45;F124;F224
【相似文献】
相关期刊论文 前10条
1 徐文昕;;国有企业预算软约束影响通货膨胀率的实证分析[J];现代商贸工业;2008年07期
2 梅丹;;政府干预、预算软约束与过度投资——基于我国国有上市公司2004～2006年的证据[J];软科学;2009年11期
3 张宇峰;王长江;;“内部人控制”与预算软约束:一个理论假说[J];南京大学学报(哲学.人文科学.社会科学版);2006年06期
4 樊胜;;利率市场化对商业银行投融资行为的影响[J];上海金融学院学报;2007年02期
5 周开国;李涛;;国有股权、预算软约束与公司价值:基于分量回归方法的经验分析[J];世界经济;2006年05期
6 陈晖;;金融发展与企业软预算约束的硬化[J];改革与战略;2007年08期
7 丁大巍;王s，
本文编号：2130266
本文链接：https://www.wllwen.com/jingjilunwen/zhongguojingjilunwen/2130266.html
