经济增长、政府财政收支与地方官员任期——来自省级的经验证据

发布时间：2018-09-13 13:19

【摘要】：文章利用除港澳台地区外全国各省份任职的党政主要领导在1994年至2012年的详细信息与省级经济社会发展情况,对省级领导人任期时长与经济增长等绩效指标,与政府开支等工具指标之间的关系进行了实证研究,发现地方经济增长率与省级领导人任期时长之间存在倒U型曲线关系,而政府收支与任期时长的关系更为复杂。结果说明,以经济绩效考核为基础的政治晋升理论并不能完全解释地方官员的经济增长行为和财政行为,地方官员或许还面临着其它不同于经济绩效的激励和约束。这一发现契合了最近中央下发的不能简单把经济总量和增长速度作为干部提拔任用的唯一标准的规定,说明建立一个更加全面的官员治理和考核体系势在必行。
[Abstract]:Based on the detailed information of the main leaders of the Party and government in all provinces except Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan from 1994 to 2012 and the economic and social development at the provincial level, the paper makes use of the performance indicators such as the duration of the term of office of the provincial leaders and economic growth. The empirical study shows that the relationship between local economic growth rate and the duration of provincial leaders' tenure is inversely U-shaped, while the relationship between government revenue and expenditure is more complicated. The results show that the political promotion theory based on economic performance appraisal can not fully explain the economic growth behavior and fiscal behavior of local officials, and local officials may also face other incentives and constraints different from economic performance. This finding coincides with the recent stipulation that the central authorities should not simply regard the total economic volume and the growth rate as the sole standard for the promotion and appointment of cadres, indicating that it is imperative to establish a more comprehensive management and assessment system for officials.
【作者单位】：中国人民大学经济学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金重大项目“加快推进经济发展方式转变和经济结构调整的我国财政政策及财政管理模式研究”(项目编号:12&ZD092)
【分类号】：D262.3;F124;F812.4

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