基于博弈论的C2B2C模式下电商信用监管机制研究

发布时间：2018-02-16 01:49

本文关键词： 电子商务网络信用 CBC 电商平台第三方信用监管博弈　出处：《系统工程理论与实践》2017年08期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：由于商户与消费者间的信息不对称性,电商失信问题日益突出.对此,作为电子商务的主要媒介,电商平台的信用监管职责不容忽视.在C2C电子商务模式中,引入电商平台为第三方信用监管方以形成C2B2C电子商务模式,并设计C2B2C电商信用监管机制,包括:保证金收取机制,信用监管机制,失信惩罚机制等.基于博弈理论,构建了C2B2C电子商务模式下的演化博弈模型与双价交易模型,对电商和消费者双方的长期交易策略进行了分析,其结果表明:提高信用保证金、增强信用监管力度、增加伪装成本能有效避免电商失信行为,减少消费者在电子商务交易中的风险.
[Abstract]:Because of the asymmetry of information between merchants and consumers, the problem of e-commerce discredit is becoming more and more serious. Therefore, as the main medium of e-commerce, the credit supervision responsibility of e-commerce platform can not be ignored. This paper introduces the e-commerce platform as the third party credit supervisor to form the C2B2C e-commerce model, and designs the C2B2C e-commerce credit supervision mechanism, including: margin collection mechanism, credit supervision mechanism, credit penalty mechanism, etc. An evolutionary game model and a bivalent trading model under the C2B2C e-commerce model are constructed, and the long-term trading strategies of both e-commerce and consumers are analyzed. The results show that the credit margin is increased and the credit supervision is strengthened. Increasing the camouflage cost can effectively avoid the behavior of e-commerce dishonesty and reduce the risk of consumers in e-commerce transactions.
【作者单位】：北京化工大学理学院;北京化工大学经济管理学院;北京航空航天大学经济管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金(71433001,71301006,71571010,71372195)~~
【分类号】：F224.32;F724.6

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