中国证券市场内幕信息操纵监管的博弈分析

发布时间：2018-03-09 15:17

本文选题：证券市场监管　切入点：内幕信息操纵　出处：《财经问题研究》2017年09期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：针对我国证券市场内幕信息操纵监管的现状,本文利用博弈论建立内幕信息操纵监管的静态博弈模型和动态博弈模型,探讨内幕信息操纵监管的内在机理,分析知情交易者与监管部门之间博弈关系的策略,对博弈模型的纯战略和混合战略纳什均衡进行求解与分析。研究表明,监管部门要加大对内幕信息操纵行为的处罚力度,增加内幕信息操纵行为的违法成本,才能降低内幕信息操纵行为,并有针对性地提出内幕信息操纵监管的对策和建议。
[Abstract]:In view of the present situation of insider information manipulation and supervision in China's securities market, this paper uses game theory to establish the static game model and dynamic game model of insider information manipulation and supervision, and probes into the internal mechanism of insider information manipulation and supervision. This paper analyzes the strategy of game relationship between informed trader and supervision department, solves and analyzes the Nash equilibrium of pure strategy and mixed strategy of game model. The research shows that the supervision department should increase the punishment for insider information manipulation. Only by increasing the illegal cost of insider information manipulation can we reduce the insider information manipulation and put forward some countermeasures and suggestions.
【作者单位】：西南大学经济管理学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金项目“我国证券市场内幕信息操纵的形成与预警研究”(13BJY174) 重庆市社会科学规划项目“中国股市内幕交易的形成机理与识别机制研究”(2012YBJJ028)
【分类号】：F224.32;F832.51

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