基于博弈论的促进可再生能源发电激励机制研究

发布时间：2018-03-11 13:23

本文选题：可再生能源　切入点：调度机制　出处：《华北电力大学(北京)》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：大力发展可再生能源是中国实现能源供应安全和缓解生态缓解压力的关键。虽然中国现阶段可再生能源电力处于蓬勃发展的时期,但是,随着电力市场化的推进,竞争的引入,围绕可再生能源发展的利益关系者之间的博弈成为影响可再生能源发展的关键因素。因此,在电力市场改革背景下,基于利益相关者博弈关系,研究建立完善的促进可再生能源发展的激励机制,是一个需要解决的重要课题。首先,本文从调度机制及配套激励机制着手,通过文献分析和资料收集,研究了现阶段国内外可再生能源发展情况和激励政策的实践经验。研究发现在世界范围内,对可再生能源的激励机制是保障可再生能源发展的关键因素,但不同国家采取的激励机制不同,采取相同激励机制的国家也会有不同的政策效果。其次,利用京津唐电网数据进行模拟,以风电为例对可再生能源的激励机制进行了分析。对调度激励机制进行了重点的分析,基于运筹优化方法和博弈论的方法建立模型,分别对计划调度机制和竞价上网调度机制进行仿真模拟。其中垂直一体化调度机制下,又划分为三个调度目标:经济成本最小为调度目标、可再生能源优先为调度目标以及能源效率最高为调度目标;竞价上网调度机制分别用古诺模型和SFE模型模拟了不同报价方式的情况,并得出电力系统纳什均衡状态。再次,对碳税机制和价格补贴机制对可再生能源发展的影响进行了仿真模拟计算,分析了不同激励机制对可再生能源发电比例的影响以及对社会福利的影响。通过对比不同调度机制对可再生能源发电的影响情况,本文得出结论认为调度激励机制能够从本质上改变可再生能源发电情况,竞价上网调度机制不仅有利于可再生能源的并网发电,而且可以大幅降低电力市场出清价格并提高社会福利水平;但是竞价上网调度机制使成本偏高的可再生能源只能被动接受市场价格,以至于难以保证盈利。本文认为在执行竞价上网机制时要进一步加强配套激励机制的执行来保障可再生能源企业的盈利情况。研究结果还显示:价格补贴机制的补偿效果强于碳税机制,但是碳税机制的无谓损失比重较小。不同激励机制之间的政策效果和对福利的影响都有所不同,不存在兼顾所有方面的完美的激励机制,不同激励机制的配合执行才能做到优势互补。
[Abstract]:Vigorously developing renewable energy is the key to realize the security of energy supply and relieve the ecological pressure in China. Although China's renewable energy and electricity is in a period of vigorous development at present, with the development of electricity marketization and the introduction of competition, The game between stakeholders in the development of renewable energy has become a key factor affecting the development of renewable energy. Therefore, in the context of electricity market reform, based on the stakeholder game relationship, It is an important task to study and establish a perfect incentive mechanism to promote the development of renewable energy. Firstly, this paper starts from the dispatching mechanism and the supporting incentive mechanism, through the literature analysis and data collection, This paper studies the experience of renewable energy development and incentive policies at home and abroad at present. It is found that the incentive mechanism of renewable energy is the key factor to ensure the development of renewable energy in the world. However, different countries adopt different incentive mechanisms, and countries that adopt the same incentive mechanism will also have different policy effects. Secondly, using Beijing-Tianjin-Tangshan power grid data to simulate, Taking wind power as an example, this paper analyzes the incentive mechanism of renewable energy, analyzes the incentive mechanism of dispatching, and establishes the model based on the optimization method of operational research and the method of game theory. Under the vertical integrated scheduling mechanism, it is divided into three scheduling objectives: the minimum economic cost is the scheduling target. Renewable energy priority is the scheduling target and the highest energy efficiency is the scheduling goal. Bidding and scheduling mechanism use Cournot model and SFE model to simulate the different bidding modes, and get the Nash equilibrium state of power system. The effects of carbon tax mechanism and price subsidy mechanism on the development of renewable energy are simulated and calculated. The effects of different incentive mechanisms on the proportion of renewable energy generation and on social welfare are analyzed, and the effects of different scheduling mechanisms on renewable energy generation are compared. In this paper, it is concluded that the scheduling incentive mechanism can change the situation of renewable energy generation in essence, and the bidding scheduling mechanism is not only beneficial to the grid power generation of renewable energy, but also beneficial to the grid generation of renewable energy. Moreover, it can greatly reduce the clearing price of the electricity market and raise the level of social welfare; but the bidding and dispatching mechanism can only passively accept the market price for the high cost renewable energy. Therefore, it is difficult to guarantee profit. This paper believes that the implementation of matching incentive mechanism should be further strengthened in order to protect the profitability of renewable energy enterprises. The research results also show that: price subsidy mechanism. The compensation effect is stronger than the carbon tax mechanism, However, the carbon tax mechanism has a relatively small proportion of unnecessary losses. The effects of policies and benefits are different among different incentive mechanisms, and there is no perfect incentive mechanism that takes all aspects into account. The cooperation and implementation of different incentive mechanisms can complement each other's advantages.
【学位授予单位】：华北电力大学(北京)
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F426.61;F224.32

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