基于博弈论的机场竞争研究

发布时间：2018-03-16 23:14

本文选题：机场　切入点：竞争　出处：《中国民用航空飞行学院》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：在经济全球化不断深入的今天,现代化的机场已不仅仅是航空运输和地面交通运输的衔接点,更是城市甚至国家的名片,是占领市场资源的关键。如果一个机场能够成为区域枢纽机场,那么其所在城市就可能成为所在区域的经济领头羊;如果一个机场能成为国际门户枢纽机场,那么该机场的所在城市就可能成为国际经济贸易中心。也正因此,机场之间出现了争抢航班和客货源的现象并日趋激烈。基于这种现状,本文确定了“基于博弈论的机场竞争研究”的选题。在国内外研究机场竞争的基础上,归纳和总结出机场竞争理论基础,包括机场竞争的内涵、产生原因、内容和形式,阐述了机场、航空公司和旅客三者之间的关系以及机场竞争对机场、航空公司和旅客的影响,对博弈论进行了简要的概述并介绍了几类经典的博弈模型。机场对航班的竞争是机场竞争研究的主要内容之一,而机场价格是机场航班竞争中的主要策略之一,因此以机场价格作为机场竞争的主要决策因素,基于伯川德模型并引入机场的拥挤成本,建立了两机场的航班竞争博弈模型并求得了博弈均衡解;根据博弈均衡解发现机场的价格、航班量和收益情况都不仅仅受机场自身容量的影响,还与竞争对手的机场容量有关;此外,机场容量的增大会造成自身价格以及对手价格下降、造成自身航班量增加以及对手航班量减少、造成自身收益增加以及对手收益减少。基于豪泰林模型并考虑机场的拥挤成本,构建了“两机场-两航空公司”的机场客源竞争博弈模型,将两机场和两航空公司在纵向关系上分成两组,针对市场对称情况,分别讨论了在没有纵向联盟、单侧纵向联盟(只有一组机场-航空公司联盟)以及双侧纵向联盟(两组机场-航空公司联盟)时的博弈,根据各种情况下的博弈均衡解分析了市场对称情况下机场之间的客源竞争策略博弈;发现在市场对称情况下,机场采取纵向联盟策略虽然可以获得更多的旅客但是并不能增加收益,所以机场不倾向于采取纵向联盟策略;但如果有机场为了追求旅客数量而采取纵向联盟策略,那么另一机场也会采取纵向联盟策略以避免客源的流失带来过多的收益损失。在市场对称时的机场客源竞争博弈模型基础上构建了不对称市场,在市场不对称情况下分别对没有纵向联盟、单侧纵向联盟以及双侧纵向联盟三种情景进行了博弈分析,并根据博弈均衡解探讨了机场在竞争中是否会采取与航空公司形成纵向联盟的策略;发现在市场不对称情况下,机场采取纵向联盟策略不仅可以获得更多的旅客,而且可以取得更高的收益,所以在市场不对称情况下机场在竞争中会采取纵向联盟策略。
[Abstract]:With the deepening of economic globalization, modern airports are not only the connecting points of air transport and ground transportation, but also the business cards of cities and even countries. Is the key to occupying market resources. If an airport can become a regional hub, then its city may become the economic leader of the region; if an airport can become an international gateway hub, Well, the city where the airport is located may become an international economic and trade center. As a result, competition between airports for flights and passenger and cargo sources is becoming increasingly fierce. Based on this status quo, This paper determines the topic of "Airport Competition based on Game Theory". On the basis of studying airport competition at home and abroad, the theoretical basis of airport competition is summarized and summarized, including the connotation, cause, content and form of airport competition. The relationship among airports, airlines and passengers and the impact of airport competition on airports, airlines and passengers are expounded. This paper briefly summarizes the game theory and introduces several classical game models. The competition between airport and flight is one of the main contents of airport competition, and airport price is one of the main strategies in airport flight competition. Therefore, taking airport price as the main decision-making factor of airport competition, based on Bertrand model and introducing the congestion cost of airport, the game model of flight competition between two airports is established and the game equilibrium solution is obtained. According to the game equilibrium solution, it is found that the price, flight volume and revenue of the airport are not only affected by the capacity of the airport itself, but also by the airport capacity of the competitors. The increase in the capacity of the airport will result in a decrease in the price of itself and its competitors, an increase in the number of its flights and a decrease in the number of rival flights, an increase in its own revenue and a reduction in its competitors' revenue. Based on the Hauterin model and taking into account the congestion costs of the airport, This paper constructs the model of "two airports-two airlines" airport passenger competition game model, divides the two airports and the two airlines into two groups in the vertical relationship, and discusses separately in the absence of vertical alliance, aiming at the situation of market symmetry. The game of unilateral vertical alliance (only one group of airports-airline alliance) and bilateral vertical alliance (two groups of airports-airline alliance), According to the game equilibrium solution under various circumstances, the paper analyzes the competition strategy game between airports under the condition of market symmetry, and finds out that in the case of market symmetry, Although the airport can gain more passengers by adopting the vertical alliance strategy, it does not tend to adopt the vertical alliance strategy, but if the airport adopts the vertical alliance strategy in order to pursue the number of passengers, the airport does not tend to adopt the vertical alliance strategy. Then the other airport will also adopt vertical alliance strategy to avoid excessive loss of revenue caused by the loss of passengers. On the basis of the game model of airport passenger source competition when the market is symmetrical, the asymmetric market is constructed. In the case of market asymmetry, the game analysis is carried out on the situation of no vertical alliance, unilateral vertical alliance and bilateral vertical alliance. According to the game equilibrium solution, the paper discusses whether the airport will take the strategy of forming vertical alliance with airlines in the competition, and finds that under the condition of market asymmetry, the airport can not only obtain more passengers by adopting vertical alliance strategy. Moreover, higher returns can be obtained, so the airport will adopt vertical alliance strategy in the competition under the condition of market asymmetry.
【学位授予单位】：中国民用航空飞行学院
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F224.32;F562.6;F271

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