基于双边连接规则的网络博弈及其稳定性研究

发布时间：2018-03-16 22:35

本文选题：网络生成博弈　切入点：二元稳定性　出处：《青岛大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：在网络生成博弈中,刻画网络稳定性的原则并非只有纳什均衡。由于成对局中人的非协同性常常导致纳什均衡的多重性,二元稳定性的概念及其变形成为非常好的补充。分别考虑了Jackson和Wolinsky网络生成博弈、Myerson连接博弈及网络生成阶段为Myerson连接博弈的重复网络博弈,针对上述博弈类型研究了相应的稳定性。首先,在JW规则之下建立了二元稳定网络的等价条件,给出了二元稳定网络、增连接情形具有边支付的二元稳定网络及具有边支付的二元稳定网络的判定算法,证明了二元稳定网络集合与具有边支付的二元稳定网络集合的交集是增连接情形具有边支付的二元稳定网络集合。其次,系统分析了社会网络结构和局中人的支付函数对于两个特定网络模型二元稳定性的影响,比较了使其分别具有二元稳定性、增连接情形具有边支付的二元稳定性及具有边支付的二元稳定性时参数范围之间的关系。基于Myerson连接博弈,针对特定网络模型分析了使其具有二元纳什稳定性的参数范围。最后,考察了网络生成阶段为Myerson连接博弈的基于策略互动的重复网络博弈,采用Shapley值作为合作解。为保证合作的稳定性,设计Shapley值的时间一致的分配补偿程序,研究了异步非理性行为操纵条件,并给出了满足异步非理性行为操纵条件的示例。
[Abstract]:In network generation game, Nash equilibrium is not the only principle to describe network stability. The concept of binary stability and its transformation are considered as a very good supplement. The Jackson and Wolinsky network generation game and the repeated network game in the Myerson connection game are considered respectively. The corresponding stability is studied for the above game types. Firstly, under the JW rule, the equivalent conditions of the binary stable network are established, and the binary stable network is given. A decision algorithm for a binary stable network with an edge payment and a binary stable network with an edge payment is proposed in the case of increasing connection. It is proved that the intersection between the set of binary stable networks and the set of binary stable networks with edge payment is a set of binary stable networks with edge payment in the case of increasing connection. The effects of social network structure and payment function on the binary stability of two specific network models are systematically analyzed, and the binary stability of the two models is compared. The relation between the binary stability with edge payment and the parameter range with the binary stability of edge payment in the case of increasing connection. Based on the Myerson connection game, The parameter range of binary Nash stability is analyzed for the specific network model. Finally, the repeated network game based on strategic interaction in the network generation stage is investigated, which is Myerson connection game. In order to ensure the stability of the cooperation, the Shapley value is used as the cooperative solution. In order to ensure the stability of the cooperation, the time-consistent allocation and compensation program of the Shapley value is designed. The condition of asynchronous irrational behavior manipulation is studied, and an example is given to satisfy the asynchronous irrational behavior manipulation condition.
【学位授予单位】：青岛大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：O157.5

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