博弈论在预防化工园区事故多米诺效应中的应用

发布时间：2018-03-20 07:27

本文选题：博弈论　切入点：化工园区　出处：《中国安全生产科学技术》2017年12期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：针对化工园区内各单元不愿意为预防相邻单元事故多米诺效应进行安全投入的问题,提出采用博弈论分析化工园区内各单元预防事故多米诺效应的投入意愿,将化工园区内2个相邻单元预防事故多米诺效应的关系定义为2人博弈的过程,构建2人博弈的支付函数与支付矩阵,讨论不同参数情形下的纳什均衡点,将实际均衡点与理想均衡点进行比较,判断园区管理者或政府机构是否应当采取相关措施。结果表明:实际化工园区所处的博弈情形与各单元均选择为预防园区事故多米诺效应的投入值有关,不同取值范围的纳什均衡点不同,园区管理者根据均衡点的不同选择相应措施。
[Abstract]:In view of the problem that every unit in the chemical industry park is unwilling to make safety investment to prevent the domino effect of adjacent units, the paper puts forward the investment intention of using game theory to analyze each unit in the chemical park to prevent the domino effect of accident. The relationship between two adjacent units to prevent the domino effect is defined as the process of two-person game. The payment function and payment matrix of the two-person game are constructed, and the Nash equilibrium points under different parameters are discussed. Compare the actual equilibrium point with the ideal equilibrium point, The result shows that the game situation of the actual chemical industry park is related to the input value of each unit selected to prevent the domino effect of the accident in the park. The Nash equilibrium points in different range of values are different, the park managers choose the corresponding measures according to the different equilibrium points.
【作者单位】：中国矿业大学(北京)资源与安全工程学院;
【基金】：国家重点研发计划项目(2016YFC0801800,2016YFC0801803)
【分类号】：F224.32;TQ086

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