重复对赌协议机制下企业两阶段融资博弈

发布时间：2018-04-15 23:26

本文选题：对赌协议 + 博弈论　；参考：《系统管理学报》2017年03期

【摘要】：采用博弈论作为研究方法,在两阶段融资重复对赌情境下,全面探讨融资企业和投资方之间的决策行为,探讨投融资双方订立的对赌目标的严格程度和企业的努力水平对企业预期收益的影响,揭示对赌协议存在的潜在风险。同时,运用Matlab软件得出:采用重复对赌结构,企业达到业绩目标的概率值要小于一次对赌达到业绩目标的概率值。这对投融资双方而言都是有利的,当第1阶段结束时,双方均有权根据阶段性结果来选择是否继续博弈或调整条款继续博弈,可以有效克服短期利益的束缚和信息风险,避免由于一次性签约业绩目标过高所采取的冒险行为,对于双方的互惠互利具有重要作用。
[Abstract]:By using the game theory as the research method, the decision-making behavior between the financing enterprise and the investor is discussed comprehensively in the context of double gambling in two stages of financing.This paper probes into the influence of the strict degree of the gambling target and the level of the enterprise's effort on the expected income of the enterprise, and reveals the potential risk of the gambling agreement.At the same time, by using Matlab software, it is concluded that the probability value of enterprise to reach the performance goal is smaller than the probability value of one bet to achieve the achievement goal.At the end of the first stage, both sides have the right to choose whether to continue the game or the adjustment clause according to the stage results, which can effectively overcome the constraints of short-term interests and information risks.Avoiding the risk-taking behavior due to the excessive target of one-off signing performance is of great importance to the mutual benefit of both parties.
【作者单位】：东华大学旭日工商管理学院;
【基金】：中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(CUSFDH-D-2015065) 国家留学基金委资助项目(201506630047)
【分类号】：F224.32;F272

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