土地整治PPP模式中政府与社会投资者演化博弈研究

发布时间：2018-04-20 19:16

本文选题：土地整治 + PPP模式　；参考：《中国农业大学学报》2017年07期

【摘要】：为构建演化博弈模型,分析地方政府与社会投资者在土地整治PPP模式中的演化路径,对南京B街道土地整治项目中地方政府与社会投资者的演化博弈进行研究。结果表明:在社会投资者期望收益r小于机会成本b时,地方政府的扶持可以提高社会投资者参与项目的积极性。随着土地整治PPP模式给地方政府和社会投资者带来的收益不断增加,地方政府的最优策略选择是扶持社会投资者、社会投资者的最优策略是参与PPP模式;在南京B街道土地整治项目中,社会投资者期望收益r大于机会成本b,社会投资者能稳定趋向参与土地整治PPP模式,地方政府对社会投资者的扶持力度受自身收益影响,当地方政府的收益越来越小时,扶持的力度会逐渐下降。为进一步提高提高社会投资者参与土地整治PPP模式的积极性,加快构建土地整治PPP模式市场,提出建立土地整治PPP模式激励机制,建立土地整治PPP模式的反向约束机制2个措施。
[Abstract]:In order to build an evolutionary game model, the evolution path of local government and social investors in the land regulation PPP model is analyzed. The evolutionary game of local government and social investors in the Nanjing B street land renovation project is studied. The results show that the support of local government can be raised when the expected income R of the social investor is less than the opportunity cost B. With the enthusiasm of the high social investors participating in the project, the optimal strategy choice of the local government is to support the social investors, and the optimal strategy of the social investors is to participate in the PPP model as the land regulation PPP model brings to the local government and the social investors, the best strategy of the local government is to participate in the PPP model. In the B street land renovation project in Nanjing, the social investors expect The income R is greater than the opportunity cost B, and the social investors can tend to participate in the land regulation PPP model steadily. The local government's support to the social investors is affected by its own income. When the local government returns more and more, the support will gradually decline. In order to further improve the social investors' participation in the land renovation PPP model We should speed up the construction of land remediation PPP mode market, and propose 2 measures to establish the incentive mechanism of land consolidation PPP mode and establish the reverse constraint mechanism of land remediation PPP mode.

【作者单位】：南京农业大学公共管理学院;南京工业大学土木工程学院;南京市水利规划设计院有限责任公司;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金项目(10BJY040)
【分类号】：F224.32;F283

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