地方政府博弈、弹性环境政策与城市群环境质量

发布时间：2018-05-06 23:32

  本文选题：地方政府博弈 + 弹性环境政策　； 参考：《南京大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：随着环境污染治理的不断深入,"京华烟云"、"雾霾倾城"等污染事件依然频繁发生。针对污染治理和污染排放同时增加这一现象,已有研究主要围绕国家和省级层面展开,忽略了城市群集合体。本文以城市群作为研究对象,探讨环境政策、地方政府博弈与城市群环境质量的关系。同时,纳入环境污染负外部性要素,构建了两阶段动态博弈模型。首先分析地方政府博弈时企业产量决策和城市环境税率决策,然后探讨城市群整体企业最优产量和环境税率标准。本文认为:第一,竞争情况下企业最优产量与本地区环境税率反向变化,与相邻地区环境税率同向变化,"产业区位重置"假说成立;第二,中心—外围城市环境税率反向变动,污染性企业倾向布局在上游环境区位,产生"以邻为壑"现象;第三,地方政府博弈产生的环境税率低于城市群统一环境税率,竞争产量2q大于城市群最优产量Q*,污染排放与产量成正相关时,地方政府相互竞争恶化了城市群环境的状况。本文采用长江三角洲城市群16个城市2003～2014年样本数据,运用ArcGIS和GeoDa检验污染物是否存在空间自相关现象。在空间自相关基础上,分别采用Queen Contiguity、Rook Contiguuity、Distance Contiguiuy三种方法进行空间计量回归。结论显示:第一,工业废气存在空间自相关现象,工业废水和工业固体废弃物不存在空间自相关;第二,中心城市环境税与外围城市环境税、污染负外部性呈反比;第三,环境税(排污费)政策有效控制了城市群环境污染排放,纳入地方政府竞争要素时排污费政策与城市群污染物排放呈正比,地方政府之间的竞争恶化了城市群整体环境。
[Abstract]:With the continuous deepening of environmental pollution control, the pollution events such as "JINGWAH smoke cloud" and "fog and haze dumping" still occur frequently. In view of the phenomenon of pollution control and pollution emission increasing at the same time, the existing research mainly focuses on the national and provincial levels, neglecting the urban agglomeration. This paper takes the urban agglomeration as the research object and discusses the environmental policy, The relationship between the game of local government and the environmental quality of urban agglomeration. At the same time, the two stage dynamic game model is built into the negative externality of environmental pollution. First, it analyzes the decision of the enterprise production and the urban environmental tax rate when the local government game, and then discusses the optimal output of the whole enterprise and the standard of the environmental tax rate. This paper holds that first, In the case of competition, the optimal output of the enterprise and the environmental tax rate in the local area is reversed, and the environmental tax rate is changed in the same area. The hypothesis of "industrial location reset" is set up. Second, the reverse change of the environmental tax rate in the central and peripheral cities, the layout of the polluting enterprises in the upstream environment area, the "beggar thy neighbour" phenomenon, and the third, the game of local government. The environmental tax rate is lower than the unified environmental tax rate of the urban agglomeration, the competitive output 2q is greater than the optimal output of urban agglomeration Q*. When the pollution discharge is positively related to the output, the local governments compete with each other to deteriorate the condition of the urban agglomeration. This paper uses the sample data of the 16 cities of the Yangtze River Delta city group for 2003~2014 years, and uses ArcGIS and GeoDa to test the pollution. On the basis of spatial autocorrelation, on the basis of spatial autocorrelation, the spatial autocorrelation of three methods, Queen Contiguity, Rook Contiguuity and Distance Contiguiuy, is used respectively. The conclusions are as follows: first, there are spatial autocorrelation phenomena in industrial waste gas, and there is no spatial autocorrelation in industrial waste water and industrial solid waste; second, The environmental tax in the central city is inversely proportional to the external environmental tax and the negative externality of the pollution. Third, the environmental tax (pollutant discharge fee) policy effectively controls the environmental pollution emission of the urban agglomeration. The pollution discharge policy of the local government is proportional to the pollutant discharge of the urban agglomeration, and the competition between the local governments worsens the overall environment of the urban agglomeration.

【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：X196;F224.32;F299.2
，

本文编号：1854406