基于前景理论的业主对设计承包商激励的博弈研究

发布时间：2018-05-26 19:54

本文选题：业主管理 + 激励机制　；参考：《华北电力大学(北京)》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：电力工程项目的建设是一项需要多方参与、多方协作的系统工程,因此,关于电力工程项目的费用控制也会涉及到多个角色。设计阶段作为工程项目的起始阶段,业主方能否在此阶段对费用进行合理有效的控制决定了整个工程的管控方向。在我国现阶段的设计取费模式下,设计单位优化设计方案、降低设计概算的动力明显不足,业主对设计承包商的管理方式需要创新。因此,建立激励机制优化业主与设计承包商之间天然存在的博弈关系,实现业主与设计承包商之间的互利共赢,进而有效的控制工程建设的总体费用是现阶段亟需解决的问题。为了解决这一问题,本文在广泛查找、阅读、分析国内外文献的基础上,研究了激励理论的发展历程及最新的研究成果,指出了现行激励理论立足于“理性人”的假设并不能够有效地解决工程中的激励问题。在这些研究的基础上,本文提出了运用心理学的相关理论知识来完善现有的激励机制。通过将目前心理学中比较前沿的前景理论引入激励研究中,本文立足于业主角度,构建了业主对设计承包商的激励模型,并将研究成果应用至合同条款中,用以指导工程实践。在相关理论的研究基础上,本文将业主对设计承包商的激励阶段划分为招投标阶段、设计阶段及施工阶段三个阶段。针对设计阶段,构建了设计进度、设计质量、经济合理三个激励指标;针对施工阶段,构建了设计变更及设计服务两个指标。将各个指标的奖惩费用运用前景理论转换为人所感受到的得失效用,以效用为基础,立足于业主方的角度,对如何对设计承包商进行激励机制的设计进行了研究,构建了符合双方心理预期的激励机制。并根据研究成果,验证了激励条款的设定能够帮助业主方在招投标阶段优选设计承包商。在模型构建的基础上,本文对近年北京市110kV变电工程历史数据进行收集。通过利用数理统计的方法,得出了经济合理指标样本数据的概率频度图和累积概率曲线,随后运用国网公司通用造价及现行激励模式的相关规定,求解得出经济合理指标的奖惩基本点及激励系数,并细化至设计费取费累计费率中。对于设计变更及设计服务指标,利用累计前景值及MATLAB中的遗传算法工具箱分别求出相应激励参数的奖惩基本点,并求解相应的激励系数及累计费率。最后根据研究结果进行了合同条款的设计,使研究结果更具有实用性。
[Abstract]:The construction of electric power engineering project is a system engineering which needs multi-participation and multi-cooperation. Therefore, the cost control of power engineering project also involves many roles. The design stage is the initial stage of the project. Whether the owner can control the cost reasonably and effectively at this stage determines the control direction of the whole project. At the present stage in our country, the design unit optimizes the design scheme and reduces the power of the design estimate obviously, and the owner's management mode of the design contractor needs to be innovated. Therefore, it is urgent to establish an incentive mechanism to optimize the natural game relationship between the owner and the design contractor, to realize the mutual benefit and win-win between the owner and the design contractor, and to effectively control the overall cost of the project construction. In order to solve this problem, based on the extensive search, reading and analysis of the literature at home and abroad, this paper studies the development of incentive theory and the latest research results. It is pointed out that the current incentive theory based on the hypothesis of "rational man" can not effectively solve the problem of incentive in engineering. On the basis of these studies, this paper puts forward to improve the existing incentive mechanism by using the relevant theoretical knowledge of psychology. By introducing the frontier foreground theory of psychology into the incentive research, this paper constructs the incentive model of the design contractor based on the owner's angle, and applies the research results to the contract terms to guide the engineering practice. Based on the research of relevant theories, this paper divides the incentive stage of the design contractor into three stages: bidding stage, design stage and construction stage. Aiming at the design stage, three incentive indexes of design progress, design quality and economy are constructed, and two indexes of design change and design service are constructed in view of the construction stage. This paper transforms the prospect theory of reward and punishment cost of each index into the benefit and loss utility that people feel. Based on the utility and based on the owner's angle, this paper studies how to design the incentive mechanism for the design contractor. The incentive mechanism which accords with the psychological expectation of both parties is constructed. According to the research results, it is verified that the setting of incentive clause can help the owner to select the design contractor in the bidding stage. Based on the model construction, this paper collects the historical data of Beijing 110kV substation project in recent years. By using the method of mathematical statistics, the probability frequency chart and cumulative probability curve of the sample data of economic and reasonable indexes are obtained, and then the general cost of the national network company and the relevant regulations of the current incentive model are used. The basic points of rewards and punishments and the incentive coefficient of the economic reasonable index are obtained, and are refined into the cumulative rate of the design fee. For the design change and design service index, the rewards and punishment basic points of the corresponding incentive parameters are obtained by using the cumulative foreground value and the genetic algorithm toolbox in MATLAB, and the corresponding incentive coefficient and cumulative rate are solved. Finally, the contract terms are designed according to the research results, which makes the results more practical.
【学位授予单位】：华北电力大学(北京)
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F224.32;F426.61

【参考文献】