基于博弈论的无线自组网动态接入激励机制

发布时间：2018-05-31 18:11

  本文选题：无线自组网 + 接入认证　； 参考：《电讯技术》2017年10期

【摘要】：无线自组网节点的能量有限导致网内节点往往拒绝承担新节点入网所带来的认证负荷。为激励无线自组网节点参与新节点的入网认证,引入博弈论的公共物品供给博弈理论和维克里-克拉克-格罗夫斯(VCG)机制理论,构建了无线自组网的动态接入激励机制。提出了认证节点选举办法,给出了新节点认证付酬和认证节点收益函数,分析了认证能量消耗。理论证明了激励机制具有策略防伪、个体理性和预算平衡3个特性。实例分析了不同参数设置情况下网内节点就新节点接入认证、个体与集体的合作博弈过程,结果表明该机制能有效地激励节点,为了自身的最大利益积极选择参与新节点的入网认证。
[Abstract]:Due to the limited energy of the nodes in the Ad Hoc network, the nodes in the network often refuse to bear the authentication load caused by the new nodes entering the network. In order to encourage wireless ad hoc network nodes to participate in the authentication of new nodes, the game theory of public goods supply game theory and the VCG-based theory of Vikrik-Kraker-Groves mechanism are introduced to construct the dynamic access incentive mechanism of wireless ad hoc networks. In this paper, the method of authentication node election is put forward, and the new node authentication payment function and authentication node income function are given, and the authentication energy consumption is analyzed. The theory proves that the incentive mechanism has three characteristics: strategic anti-counterfeiting, individual rationality and budget balance. An example is given to analyze the cooperative game process between individual and collective nodes under different parameters. The results show that the mechanism can effectively motivate the nodes. For their own best interests to actively choose to participate in the new node network authentication.
【作者单位】： 空军工程大学信息与导航学院;国防科技大学信息通信学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(61401499,61174162)
【分类号】：O225;TN92
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本文编号：1960805