演化博弈中的突变和作弊行为—对策略演化的影响

发布时间：2018-06-05 01:33

本文选题：演化博弈 + 突变　；参考：《浙江大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：真实世界中,合作是普遍存在的现象,合作的共性是合作者付出一定成本使博弈对手或整个群体获得一定收益。为何自然选择能够指向合作这一最终结果,长期以来吸引了各领域学者的注意,重连机制、名誉机制和惩罚机制等促进合作演化的机制也相继提出。不过加入突变后,这三种机制是否还能促进合作演化的研究相对较少。而如今随着网络和通信的发展,越来越多的人类之间的交互并没有物理世界中的联系,于是就存在了作弊的可能,作弊的加入对策略演化会产生什么影响也依然未知。本文采用囚徒博弈作为实验博弈,在演化博弈的仿真框架下,研究了重连、名誉和惩罚机制对策略演化的影响。并在此基础上加入突变和作弊,研究突变的作弊对策略演化的影响。主要工作包括以下两个方面:1.重现了重连、名誉和惩罚机制下对合作演化的促进的实验,并且在此基础上加入了突变,研究突变对几种机制中的策略演化的影响。发现突变的加入会导致重连机制不再能够促进合作的演化,而名誉机制和惩罚机制对突变带来的不好的影响有较好的抵御效果。2.在1的基础上加入作弊,对重连、名誉和惩罚机制下的演化模型做出相应扩展,研究不同的作弊成本和初始作弊率对策略演化的影响。发现作弊会导致大多数促进合作演化的机制失效。但作弊成本大于0时,重连机制下,在滞态网络的演化中作弊策略会灭绝;而惩罚机制下,合作策略在动态网络下的能够有效的抵御作弊带来的不良影响。最后初始作弊率的变化对策略的演化没有明显影响。
[Abstract]:In the real world, cooperation is a universal phenomenon, and the commonality of cooperation is that the cooperator pays a certain cost to the game opponent or the whole group to gain a certain profit. Why natural selection can point to the final result of cooperation has attracted the attention of scholars in various fields for a long time and the mechanisms of reconnection reputation and punishment have been put forward to promote the evolution of cooperation. However, there is relatively little research on whether these three mechanisms can promote cooperative evolution after the addition of mutation. Nowadays, with the development of network and communication, more and more human interaction has no connection in the physical world, so there is the possibility of cheating, and the influence of cheating on the evolution of strategy is still unknown. In this paper, prisoner game is used as experimental game, and the influence of reconnection, reputation and punishment mechanism on strategy evolution is studied under the framework of evolutionary game simulation. On this basis, mutation and cheating are added to study the influence of mutation cheating on strategy evolution. The main work includes the following two aspects: 1. The experiment of promoting cooperative evolution under the mechanism of reconnection reputation and punishment is reappeared and on this basis mutation is added to study the influence of mutation on the evolution of strategies in several mechanisms. It is found that the addition of mutation will result in the reconnection mechanism can no longer promote the evolution of cooperation, while the reputation mechanism and punishment mechanism have a better resistance to the adverse effects of mutation. 2. On the basis of 1, we add cheating, extend the evolutionary model under reconnection, reputation and punishment mechanism, and study the influence of different cheating cost and initial cheating rate on strategy evolution. The discovery of cheating results in the failure of most mechanisms that contribute to the evolution of cooperation. However, when the cost of cheating is greater than 0, the cheating strategy will become extinct in the evolution of the hysteresis network under the reconnection mechanism, while under the punishment mechanism, the cooperative strategy can effectively resist the adverse effects of cheating under the dynamic network. Finally, the change of initial cheating rate has no significant effect on the evolution of strategy.
【学位授予单位】：浙江大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：O225

【相似文献】