基于完全信息动态博弈的维修外包策略研究

发布时间：2018-06-07 13:17

本文选题：预防维修 + 事后维修　；参考：《系统工程学报》2017年03期

【摘要】：维修外包可以为企业带来经济效益,降低企业负担.为方便建模,以往研究未区分故障严重程度,且通常假设维修费用为一定值.然而,大型设备一般由若干子系统和单元构成,不同子系统和单元的失效维修费用存在巨大差异.结合前期对失效部件的分类研究结果,在考虑不同故障的维修费用差异基础上,给出了两种不同维修外包策略:1)外包所有故障类型的维修业务,2)外包除了Type-I故障以外的所有维修业务.假定生产设备的拥有者(客户)和提供维修服务方(代理)作为博弈参与人,构建了两种策略下的完全信息非合作动态博弈模型,并给出了基于客户和代理联合剩余最大化条件下的纳什均衡,进而展开了数值分析.结果发现,考虑故障类型差异可以带来更大期望效用.
[Abstract]:Maintenance outsourcing can bring economic benefits to enterprises and reduce the burden of enterprises. In order to facilitate modeling, previous studies did not distinguish the severity of failure, and usually assumed that the maintenance cost was a certain value. However, large equipment is generally composed of several subsystems and units, and the failure maintenance costs of different subsystems and units vary greatly. Considering the difference of maintenance cost of different faults, combined with the results of earlier research on the classification of failure parts, This paper presents two different maintenance outsourcing strategies: 1) Outsourcing all maintenance services of all fault types (2) outsourced all maintenance services except for Type-I faults. Assuming that the owner of production equipment (customer) and the provider of maintenance service (agent) act as game participants, a non-cooperative dynamic game model with complete information is constructed under two strategies. The Nash equilibrium based on the maximization of joint residual between customer and agent is given, and the numerical analysis is carried out. It is found that considering the difference of fault type can bring greater expected utility.
【作者单位】：内蒙古大学经济管理学院;西南财经大学工商管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71501103,71471149) 内蒙古自然科学基金资助项目(2015BS0705)
【分类号】：F224.32;F273

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