地方政府债务风险的博弈论分析及优化治理研究

发布时间：2018-06-07 19:17

本文选题：地方政府债务 + 违约风险　；参考：《中国软科学》2017年08期

【摘要】：近年来我国地方政府债务规模急剧增长、债务率高,普遍已发生债务违约,未来债务还款压力大,地方政府债务已经成为影响我国金融安全和经济稳定发展的社会问题。本文运用博弈论剖析地方政府巨额债务形成机理,分析地方政府因追求最大利益空间由正常举债演变到过度举债之原因,探讨巨额债务发生违约的风险性。本文进一步提出地方政府债务优化治理建议:建立科学政绩观与奖惩机制、设定地方政府债务适度规模与合理债务结构、建立地方政府债务风险预警信息披露制度、加强土地财政改革、完善相关法规法制建设、建立专项偿债基金和违约保险机制等,这些措施将能加强地方政府债务风险管理与保障。
[Abstract]:In recent years, the scale of local government debt in China has increased sharply, the debt rate is high, the default of debt has generally occurred, and the future debt repayment pressure is great. Local government debt has become a social problem affecting the financial security and economic stability and development of our country. This paper analyzes the formation mechanism of local governments' huge debts by using game theory, analyzes the reasons for the local governments' evolution from normal borrowing to excessive borrowing for the pursuit of maximum benefit space, and probes into the risk of huge debts defaulting. This paper further puts forward some suggestions for optimizing the governance of local government debt: establishing the scientific achievement view, reward and punishment mechanism, setting up the appropriate scale and reasonable debt structure of local government debt, and establishing the early warning information disclosure system of local government debt risk. Strengthening the land finance reform, perfecting the legal construction of relevant laws and regulations, establishing the special fund for debt service and the mechanism of insurance against default, these measures will strengthen the risk management and protection of local government debt.
【作者单位】：九江学院;武汉理工大学;
【基金】：博士后特别资助基金项目(2014T0728) 江西省社会科基金项目(13YJ15) 江西科技厅软科学基金项目(20151BBA10009) 江西省普通本科高校中青年教师发展计划访问学者专项资金项目资助(2015)
【分类号】：F224.32;F812.5

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