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试论乡村治理中村民内部利益主体博弈策略——基于智猪博弈分析

发布时间:2018-08-17 12:30
【摘要】:目前,国家针对乡村治理制定了相关的政策,但是政策的具体实施却遇到了很大的困难,影响了乡村治理的改进,不利于整个乡村的发展。主要原因在于乡村治理中各个利益主体为了各自利益最大化而进行的博弈策略选择,忽视了乡村整体利益的最大化。本文从经济学博弈论的角度分析了对乡村治理具有最重要影响的利益主体——村民内部之间利益主体的博弈。以经典的"智猪博弈"为模型分析精英村民和普通村民的博弈选择,分析二者为了追求各自利益的最大化而展开博弈策略选择的结果,从共同利益最大化的角度,提出了解决方法,使之达到博弈均衡。
[Abstract]:At present, the country has formulated the related policies for rural governance, but the concrete implementation of the policy has encountered great difficulties, which has affected the improvement of rural governance and is not conducive to the development of the whole village. The main reason lies in the game strategy choice for the benefit maximization of each main body in the rural governance, neglecting the maximization of the whole rural interest. From the angle of economic game theory, this paper analyzes the game between the main interests of villagers, which has the most important influence on rural governance. This paper analyzes the game choice of elite villagers and ordinary villagers with the classic "Zhizhu Game" model, and analyzes the results of the game strategy selection between them in order to pursue the maximization of their respective interests, and from the angle of maximization of common interests. A solution is proposed to achieve game equilibrium.
【作者单位】: 吉林大学生物与农业工程学院;
【分类号】:D422.6;F224.32;F323.6


本文编号:2187633

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